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SUMMERS V EARTHISLAND INSTITUTE REJECTS
PROBABILISTIC STANDING, BUT A "REALISTIC THREAT" OF
HARM IS A BETTER STANDING TEST
By
BRADFORD MANK*
In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Supreme Court recently
rejected the proposed test for organizational standing in Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion based upon the statistical probabilty that some of an
organization's members will likely be harmed in the near future by a
defendant's allegedly illegal actions. Implicitly, however, the Court had
previously recognized some form ofprobabilstic standing in Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw, which found standing where plaintiffs avoided
recreational activities because of "reasonable concerns" about future
health injuries from pollution; Summers did not overrule Laidlaw. There
is an inherent tension between the Summers and Laidlaw decisions. This
Article applies the Summers and Laidlaw frameworks to the facts in
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency
(NRDC II), where the D.C Circuit found standing because the
government's exemption from regulation of certain uses of methyl
bromide, an ozone-destroying chemical, would cause two to four
lifetime sldn cancer cases among NRDC's members. Both Summers and
Laidlaw produce questionable results when applied to NRDC H 's facts.
The "realistic threat" test in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in
Summers offers a better approach to standing than either Summers 's
unrealistic demand that plaintiffs precisely predict the future or
Laidlaw 's focus on whether a plaintiff avoided recreational activities
rather than whether the defendant's activities caused actual harm.
There was a more realistic threat ofharm in Summers than Laidlaw, but
* James Helmer, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law, P.O. Box
210040, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040, Telephone (513) 556-0094,
Fax (513) 556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank Robin Craig and Michael Solimine for
their comments. All errors or omissions are my responsibility. This article is one of a series of
explorations of possible extensions of modem standing doctrines. The other pieces are
1) Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens? Massachusetts v. EPA's
New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008); 2) Standing and Future
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standingfor the Unborn., 34 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L.
1 (2009); and 3) Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 665 (2009).
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the Co urt found standing in the latter case and not the former case. The
Court's current approach to standing for organizational plaintiffs and
probabilstic risks is seriously flawed and the realstic threat test offers
a more rational approach to assess which iq/uries are sufficiently
serious for standing in Article I federal courts. Frthermore, a
realistic threat test for standing is more consistent with congressional
intent in enacting several citizen suit statutes that are involved in the
vast m4/ority of cases in which constitutional standing is at issue. The
Court should abandon both the Summers and Laidlaw approaches to
standing and instead adopt Justice Breyer's proposed realistic threat
test to achieve more equitable and uniform standing determinations
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1. INTRODUCTION
To fie suit in Article Ill federal courts, a plaintiff must demonstrate
"standing" by establishing that the defendant's actions have caused an actual
or imminent injury, and not merely a speculative or hypothetical injuiy that
might occur someday.' In the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Surmmers v.
Earth Island Institute , Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion rejected
the concept of organizational standing based upon the statistical
probability' that some of an organization's members will likely be harmed in
the near future by a defendant's allegedly illegal actions.4 By contrast,
Justice Stephen Breyer's dissenting opinion proposed a "realistic threat"
test for determining when an injury is sufficient for standing that would
consider whether it is probable that at least one member of an organization
will be harmed in the near future by a defendant's actions." Justice Scalia
argued that the "dissent would have us replace the requirement of iminent
harm, which it acknowledges our cases establish, with the requirement of a
realistic threat that reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause [the
plaintiff] harm in the reasonably near future."6 The Court held that the
plaintiff organizations failed to establish that they would suffer an
"imminent" injury sufficient for standing because they could not prove
where and when their specific members would be harmed in the future by
the government's allegedly illegal policy of selling fire-damaged timber
without public notice and comment!
Although Justice Scalia's decision in Summers might appear to close
the door to organizational standing based upon a statistical probability of
harm, the Court's earlier decision in Fiiends of the Efiarth, Inc. v. LailaW
Envi-rnental Servces (TOG), Inc. (Laidaw)8 implicitly accepted
1 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see infa Part 11.
2 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
3 Arguably, there are different types of statistical probability at issue in different standing
cases. First, in Summeis, the probability of harm depended in part on the voluntary actions of
the plaintiff organization's members in visiting various national parks and forests that could be
affected by the Forest Service's policies and it was possible that no member would be affected.
See inzfm~ Part IV. Second, in "toxic tort" cases involving harmful chemicals, science can predict
that some people will suffer adverse health impacts from the release of certain chemicals, but
cannot predict which individuals will be harmed by those chemicals in the future, and the
affected individuals may have little voluntary control in avoiding the harms. See infr Part V1.
Courts may implicitly consider these issues in making standing decisions, but their standing
decisions have not systematically distinguished among different types of statistical probability.
This Article will refer to all of these cases as involving statistical probability, but in a future case
these arguably different types of statistical probability might affect the standing analysis.
4 129 S. Ct. at 1150-51. Justice Scalia's majority opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Id at 1146. Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id
5 Id at 1158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6 Id at 1152-53 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omnitted) (alteration in
original) (citation om-itted).
7 Id at 1150-51.
8 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
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probabilistic standing in some circumstances! Despite the plaintiffs' failure
to prove that the defendant's mercury discharges caused harm to the
environment or human health, the Laidlaw decision concluded that the
plaintiffs' affidavits demonstrating that they had avoided recreational use of
a river because of their "reasonable concerns" about the mercury's impact
on their health was sufficient for standing.'0 Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in that case argued that, plaintiffs usually should have to
demonstrate irnjury both to the environment and themselves to have
standing." lInpicitly, LaidlaWs reasonable concerns test is based upon an
estimate of the statistical probability of future harm."
The Sunimeis decision's blanket rejection of probabilistic standing is in
considerable tension with LaiclaW~s reasonable concerns test, which
Summeis did not question. 3 In fact, the plaintiffs in Summers had far
stronger evidence that they would be harmed by the defendant's actions
than the plaintiffs in Laidlaw 4 It is not clear that the plaintiffs in Laidlaw
could meet the realistic threat test proposed by Justice Breyer in his
dissenting opinion in Summers'" If the Supreme Court's current standing
jurisprudence would find no standing in Summers, but standing in the far
weaker Laidlaw decision, then there is a problem with the Court's
standing jurisprudence.' 6
In the short term, courts are likely to distingulsh Summers and
Laidlaw. '" The Laidla w decision involved plaintiffs who avoided recreational
activities in a river because of the defendant's illegal discharge of a toxic
pollutant into the river.' In cases factually similar to Laidlaw, courts are
likely to rely on Laidlaw and ignore any doubts about the severity of the
harm. '" On the other hand, in most cases in which all of the alleged government
harm will occur in the future, Summemsprecludes probabilistic standing. 0
There remain some difficult cases in which it is not obvious whether
Summers or Laidlaw should control. For example, if the government allows
the release of ozone-destroying chemicals (ODCs) that are likely to cause
damage to the Earth's ozone layer, and that damage will allow more
dangerous ultraviolet (7ITV) light that will cause skin cancer in the future,
does Summergs rejection of probabilistic standing preclude standing or
does Laidla Ws reasonable concerns test apply?2' In its 2006 decision Natural
9 Seeinfra Part Ill.A
10 528 U.S. at 184-89.
11 Id at 198-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Part 1HI.
12 Lboa part Ill.
13 See infra Parts VI.C, Vill.
14 See Adra Part VI.C.
M1 See infra Parts VI. C, V11.
16 See infra Parts Vi. C, VIE[.
17 InfM part V.
18 inf Par IHA
19 See infra Part V.
20 jjjZftf par V.
21 See ifra Part VI.
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Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency (NRDCII),n
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) had standing because
two to four of their approximately 500,000 members would likely get skin
cancer from the government's exemptions for methyl bromide, a chemical
that destroys ozone.? The NRDC Hf decision is the best example of a court
granting standing to an organization based upon the statistical probability
that some of its members will be harmed in the future2 After Swnmeis, the
Supreme Court might reject standing in a case similar to NRDCHbecause it
is impossible to prove which specific members of NRDC will contract skin
cancer because of increased UJV radiation. On the other hand, the statistical
evidence predicting future harm was more impressive in NRDC ff than in
Laidlaw, where the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing because of
their reasonable concerns about mercury pollution, even without proof of
actual harm to anyone. If neither the Summers nor the Laidiaw decision
would recognize standing in the NRDC II decision, then it is time for the
Court to revise its standing test to determine when there is a realistic threat
of harm.2
In Summers; Justice Scalia declared, "Standing, we have said, is not an
ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable ... [but] requires .. .
a factual showing of perceptible harm. 28 The tension between the reasoning
in Summers and Laidlaw is an invitation for ingenious pleading.2a For
example, a clever lawyer might fit the facts in NRDC Il within the Laidiaw
rubric by having some plaintiffs fie affidavits stating that they avoid
sunbathing, swimm-ing, or other recreational activities because of their
reasonable concerns about avoiding skin cancer, even though the essential
issue in the case is about future harm to unknown plaintiffs. 3
The realistic threat test in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in
Summers offers a better approach to standing than either Summerss
unrealistic demand that plaintiffs precisely predict the future or LaidlaWs
focus on whether a plaintiff avoided recreational activities rather than
whether the defendant's activities caused actual harm .' There was a more
realistic threat of harm in Summers than Laidiaw, yet the Court found
standing in the latter case but not the former case.32 The Court's current
approach to standing for organizational plaintiffs and probabilistic risks is
22 464 F. 3d 1 .(D.C. Cir. 2006).
23 Idat 7,11; infra Part VI.A
24 InfraPart VI.A.
25 See Sumnmers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009) (rejecting standing based on statistical
probability that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future); infra Part V.C.
26 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 184-85 (2000); infra Parts LlA, VI.C.
27 infra parts VI. C, VII.
28 Summeis; 129 S. Ct. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992)).
29 See infra part VI C.
30 See infra Part VlC.
31 See infra Part VII.
32 See infra Parts VC, VI.C.
20101 3
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
seriously flawed and the realistic threat test offers a more rational approach
to assess which irjuries are sufficiently serious for standing in Article III
federal courts.n
Furthermore, a realistic threat test for standing is more consistent with
congressional intent in enacting several citizen suit statutes that are involved
in the vast majority of cases. in which constitutional standing is at issue.3
Some citizen suit statutes, especially in the area of environmental law, allow
'any person" to sue if the government underenforces the law.3 Although
congressional intent is not completely binding on the courts in cases
involving constitutional standing, Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice
Breyer have each explained that courts should give significant import to
Congress's definition of what is a "concrete injury" for standing purposes.'
Part II summarizes standing doctrine. Part HI explains Laidlaw. Part IV
explicates Summers. Part V addresses the easy cases where Summers and
33 See infra Part VII.
3 Summers, Laidlaw, and NRDC11all involved citizen suits. See infra Parts III, IV, VI. All of
the significant cases in infra Part V.B also involved citizen suits.
35 See, e.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 § 309, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2006);
Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973
§ 11, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520,
30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(2006); Safe Drinking Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)
(2006); see also Heather Elliott, The Phacdons of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 493 & n.160
(2008); Bradford Mank, Standing and Statisdcal Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing,
36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 665, 681-82 n.81 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Statistcal Persons].
Justice Breyer's approach to standing is rooted in a "public law" conception of standing that
seeks to prevent the Executive Branch from ignoring congressional directives in statutes
addressing matters of public concern, including public health and the environment, by allowing
liberal use of citizen suits to enforce the law. Elliott, supra, at 484 (arguing that public rights
statutes that give many citizens the right to clean environment or safe products allow citizens to
have standing to sue because each citizen has a concrete and particularized injury); Cass
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1471 (1988)
(arguing that courts may allow suits challenging executive compliance with the law). See
generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281
(1976) (discussing public rights statutes that give each citizen the right to clean environment or
safe products). By contrast, Justice Scalia used separation of powers concerns about protecting
the discretion of the Executive Branch to limit the scope of judicial authority in Lujan, 504 U.S.
555, 559-78 (1992), which arguably is grounded in a private law or common law view of the
judiciary that limits courts to adjudicating disputes involving concrete injuries that would be
largely if not entirely recognizable to common law English judges. But see id at 602 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the "principal effect" of Justice Scalia's majority opinion's
restrictive approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the
expense-not of the Courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and
emanates"); Elliott, supra, at 496 (arguing courts should not use standing doctrine as "a
backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power"); Gene R. Nichol, Foreword,
The Impossibility ofLtUjan's Project 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 193, 196 (2001) ("Lujan, in full
flower, would strike at congressionally authorized standing and the claimed 'overjudicialization'
of the operation of American government."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170,
1170-71 (1993) (criticizing Lujan as "an insupportable judicial contraction of the legislative
power to make judicially enforceable policy decisions").
36 See infra Part V.B.
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Laidlaw can be neatly distinguished. Part VI examines the NRDCHdecision
in light of Summers and Laidlaw. Part VII argues that the Court should
overrule Summers and instead adopt Justice Breyer's realistic threat test in
his dissenting opinion.
II. STANDING DOCTRINE
A. Constitutional Standing
Although the Constitution does not explicitly require that a plaintiff
have standing to file suit in federal courts, since 1944 the Supreme Court has
inferred from the Constitution's Article III limitation of judicial decisions to
"cases" and to "controversies" that federal courts must utilize standing
requirements to guarantee that the plaintiff has a genuine interest and stake
in a case.37 Litigants in federal Article III courts must meet certain standing
requirements to bring a suit." The federal courts have jurisdiction over a
case only if at least one plaintiff can prove that he or she has standing for
each form of relief sought." The standing doctrine resolves whether a party
to a lawsuit is a proper party to sue and does not decide whether the
37 Article III of the U.S. Constitution indicates,
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CoNsT. art. M, § 2; Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating explicitly the Article
III standing requirement in a Supreme Court case for the first time); see DaimlerChrysler Corp.
v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339-43 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III's
case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations); Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) ("Article III standing ... enforces the Constitution's
case-or-controversy requirement . . . ."); see also Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater
Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens? Massachusetts v. EPA ' New Standing Test for States,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1709-10 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing]; Mank,
Standing and Statisdcal Persons, supra note 35, at 673-74; Ryan Guilds, Comment,
A Juisprudence of Doubt Generalized Gnevances as a Limitation to Federal Court Access,
74 N.C. L. REV. 1863,-1867, 1871-75 (1996). But see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "yudes, " and Article 1X 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168-79, 208 (1992)
(arguing framers of the Constitution did not intend that Article I would require standing).
38 Mank, States Standing, supra note 37, at 1709-10; Michael E. Solimine, Recalbrating
Justiciabilityin Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 533 (2004).
39 DainlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351-53; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("[A] plaintiff must
demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought."); Mank, Standing and
Statistical Peisons, supra note 35, at 673. Standing is one factor in determining whether a suit is
legitimately justiciable in court. Jeremy Gaston, Note, Standing on Its Head: The Problem of
Thture Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions; 77 TEX. L. REV. 215, 219 (1998) ("Standing is one
aspect of the doctrine of justiciability . ... Other aspects of justiciability include the doctrines of
ripeness, mootness, advisory opinions, and political questions.").
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asserted claim is appropriate. 4 0 A federal court must dismiss a case without
deciding the merits if the plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional standing test.4 1
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional principles.
The standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.42
Furthermore, standing requirements support separation of powers principles
defining the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches
of government so that the "Federal Judiciary respects the proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."'
For standing in an Article Ill court, the Supreme Court, in its 1992
decision Lqjan v. Defenders of Wildlife," required a plaintiff to show that
1) she has "suffered an injury-in-fact,"" which is a) "concrete and
particularized"" and b) "actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical";4 ' 2) "there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly... trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court";" and 3) "it must
be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision." 9 A plaintiff has the burden of establishing all three
prongs of the standing test."
In its 1975 decision Warth v. Seldin," the Court first explicitly
recognized that "an association may have standing solely as the
40 Gaston, supra note 39, at 221.
41 See DaimlerGhysler, 547 U.S. at 340-42; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 180 ("[Wle have an
obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the
litigation."); Mank, States Standing, supra note 37, at 1710; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 673.
42 Mank, Standing and Statstical Persons, supra note 35, at 680; Jonathan Remy Nash,
Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 494, 506 (2008); see
Dainler~laysler, 547 U.S. at 340; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1998).
43 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); Nash, supra note 42, at 506; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the.Separation of Powers, 17 SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 881,
881, 896 (1983).
4 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
45 Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 771).
46 Id
47 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990)).
48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
49 Id. at 560-61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43);
Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming- Islury to All biury to None., 35 ENVTL. L. 1,
23-24 (2005) [hereinafter Mank, Global Warming].
50 DaimlerCluysler, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (stating that parties asserting federal
jurisdiction must "carry the burden of establishing their standing under Article III"); Lilan,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (stating also that parties asserting federal jurisdiction must carry the
burden of establishing standing under Article III); Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 673-74.
51 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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representative of its members," despite "the absence of injury to itself . The
Court warned, however, that "the possibility of such representational
stadig ... does not eliminate or attenuate the constitutional requiremenit
of a case or controversy. ,,n The court stated that the association must allege
that at least one of its members is "suffering immediate or threatened injury
as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves brought sut."54
B Relaxed Stan dmg m Procedural Cases
In cases involving procedural violations, such as the failure of the
government to prepare an environmental impact statement pursuant to the
National Environmental Policy Act. (NEPA), 55 courts relax the imminence
and redressability portions of the standing test. 6 Implicitly, courts in cases
involving procedural violations are more willing to consider probabilistic
injuries for standing, although courts in such cases do not always explicitly
acknowledge the probabilistic nature of the injury." In footnote seven of
Lulan, Justice Scalia stated that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete injury
resulting from a procedural error by the government are entitled to a more
relaxed application of redressability and immediacy standing requirements
because remedying the procedural violation by, for example, providing for
additional comment, may not change the substantive decision by the
58governm-ent . Jutc Scalia offered the example of a plaintiff who lives ne 'ar
a proposed dam who seeks an environmental assessment under NEPA to
study its potential environmental impacts as the prototypical example of a
procedural injury. 5 He stated,
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are special:
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
52 Id. at 511; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 677-78;
Christopher J. Roche, Note, A Litigation Association Model to Aggregate Mass Tort Claims for
Adjudication, 91 VA. L. REV. 1463, 1493 (2005).
53 Wart/i, 422 U.S. at 511; see also Mask, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 678; Roche, supra note 52, at 1493.
54 Warti, 422 U.S. at 511; see also Mask, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 678; Roche, supra note 52, at 1493.
55 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
56 See Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992); Kimberly N. Brown, Justiciable Generalized
Gievances, 68 MD. L. REV. 221, 257-64 (2008) (discussing the Court's leniency in deciding
standing in cases involving procedural violations). A plaintiff must still have alleged that the
proposed government action would have some possibility of causing him a concrete harm.
Justice Scalia explained that a person who lives next to a proposed dam site can sue regarding
the government's alleged failure to prepare as environmental impact statement, but not
someone who lives in a distant state. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; Mank, States Standing, supra note
37, at 1717. The Supreme Court has never clearly explained to what extent the immediacy or
redressablity portions of the standing test are relaxed in procedural rights cases. Id at 1718-20.
57 Mask. Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 668, 707.
58 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
59 Id; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 35-36; Mask, States Standing, supra
note 37, at 1716.
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interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to
the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed damn has standing to
challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an enviromnental impact
statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the
statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the
dam will not be completed for many years.w
Justice Scalia limited footnote seven standing to plaintiffs who would
suffer concrete injuries resulting from the government's procedural error.6
Under footnote seven, a plaintiff living near a proposed dam has a potential
concrete injury that poses a risk significant enough to provide standing, but
" persons who live (and propose to live) at the other end of the country from
the dam" do not have "concrete interests affected" and do not have standing
to challenge a procedural violation.60
The relaxation of the imminence requlrement for procedural plaintiffs
implicitly allows some type of probabilistic standing in procedural cases.3
Footnote seven in the Lujan decision implies that a procedural rights
plaintiff may obtain standing for a threatened risk, such as a dam that might
be built in the future. In the dam example, there is only a serious possibility
and not a guarantee that the goverm-nent will build a dam, yet the Lid~an
Court recognized that standing was appropriate for the plaintiffs who are
most realistically likely to suffer an injury if the dam is built. 14
While a plaintiff usually must demonstrate that it is "likely" that an
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, 0 plaintiffs. asserting that the
government has violated a procedural requirement are entitled to a remedy
requiring the government to follow the procedural requirements even if it is
uncertain that, for example, a judicial order requiring the government to
conduct an environmental impact statement under NEPA will lead the
government to change its substantive decision to build a dam. 6 In
Massachusetts v. Environmnental Protection Agency (Massachusetts v
EPA),"' the Court explicitly adopted a probabilistic approach to whether a
remedy is sufficient for a plaintiff alleging a procedural violation by stating
60 Luean, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Cantrell v. Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 682 (9th Cir. 2001)
(discussing relaxed standing requirements for procedural injuries); Mask, Global Warming,
supra note 49, at 35-36 & n.240; Blake R. Bertagna, Comment, "Standing" Up for the
Environment The Ability of Paintiffs to Establish Legal Standing to Redress Inies Caused by
Global Warming, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 415, 457 (2006).
61 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
62 Id at 572 n.7, 573 n.8 ("[Wie do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural
rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing."); William W.
Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Uiverse, 11 DuKE ENvrL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 257 (2001);
Mask, States Standing, supra note 37, at 1716.
63 See Mask, Standing and Statisti cal Persons, supra note 35, at 722, 748.
rA See Luan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
65 Idat560-6 1.
66 Id at 572 n. 7; Mank, Global Wanning supra note 49, at 35-36 & n.240.
67 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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that procedural rights litigants only needed to demonstrate "some
possibility" that their requested remedy would redress a procedural injury:
"When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if
there is some possibilty that the requested relief will prompt the injury-
causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant."'
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected the argument by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that the petitioners had to
prove that U.S. courts could remedy the global problem of climate change,
and instead determined that the petitioners satisfied the redressability
portion of the standing test because a court order requiring EPA to regulate
emissions from new vehicles could "slow or reduce" global climate change."
The Massachusetts v. EPA decision's use of the "some possibility" test
appears to be applicable to all procedural plaintiffs,"' but the Court's specific
standing analysis in the case may be limited to state plaintiffs."
C. Imminent Risks in Nonprocedural Cases
Even in ordinary, nonprocedural standing cases, the Court has
suggested that a plaintiff may obtain standing for a threatened risk. Prior to
its Lujan decision, in Babbitt v. United Faim Workers National Union," the
Court stated, "[O]ne does not have to await the consummation of threatened
injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is
enough."73 The Lyjan Court's recognition of standing for an imminent injury
appears to be similar to Babbitt's approach to impending injuries.74 The
imminent injury test, however, does not clearly explain how probable a risk
to a plaintiff must be or how soon it must occur for the litigant to have
8 Id at 518 (emphasis added); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Peisons, supra
note 35, at 674.
69 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 525; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Peisons,
supra note 35, at 675.
70 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517-18; Mank, States Standing, supra note 37,
at 1727 (arguing the "some possibility" standard in Massachusetts v. EPA applies to all
procedural plaintiffs).
71 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518-20; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 695-96 (discussing uncertainties about whether standing analysis in
Massachusetts v. EPA applies only to states or to all plaintiffs); Dawn M. Kurz, Note, The Return
of the Lanar: Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S Ct. 1438 (2007), Can States "Speak" for the Trees.$
87 NEB. L. REv. 1055, 1076-80 (2009).
72 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
73 Id at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,
262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (reasoning that a threatened injury may satisfy
standing requirement); Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. (Gaston Copper), 204 F.3d 149, 160
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened
rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III standing requirements.").
74 See Lufan, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber
Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (interpreting "imminent" standing test to include an
increased risk of harm).
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standing.5 For example, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the imminent
standing test to include an increased risk of harm, 6 but that approach is
arguably contrary to Justice Scalia's subsequent Sunmers decision.7
III. LAIDIAw
A. Mjoity Decision
In Laidlaw, the Court stated that a threatened injury that alters a
plaintiffs recreational activities may be enough for standing if the plaintiff
has reasonable concerns about the risk. LaidlaWs reasonable concerns test
implicitly incorporates a probabilistic analysis because reasonableness is a
relative term depending upon the probabilities of real life. The Court
recognized standing even though the plaintiffs could not show that the
defendant's activities had or would harm human health or the environment.
The plaintiffs argued that they had standing to sue a defendant that
discharged mercury into a river because they avoided swimming or fishing in
a river due to their fear of possible harms from the mercury, although they
could not prove that the concentrations of mercury were likely to harm them
or the environment."
The Laidlaw decision did not require the plaintiffs to prove that the
environment had suffered an actual injury or was likely to suffer an injury in
the future, but instead focused on whether the plaintiffs had reasonable
grounds to change their recreational activities."' The Court stated that in
environmental cases "[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III
standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff."8 The
75 Bradford Mank, Standing and Future Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open
Standing for Generations to Come., 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 39 (2009) [hereinafter Mank,
Future Generations]; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 685.
76 Ecological Rights Found, 230 F.3d at 1151 (interpreting "inuinent" standing test to
include an increased risk of harm).
77 See infra Part W.A.
78 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
79 Id; see also Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 40-41; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 685-87. One scholar has argued that the district court erred
in concluding that Laidlaw's mercury releases posed no risk to the plaintiffs or the environment
and that the releases in fact did pose a serious risk. Robin Kundis Craig, Removing "The Cloak
of a StandinglInquiyl Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the In4ury-in-Fact
Analysis, 29 CARDOzo L. REV. 149, 181-82 (2007). Even if Professor Craig's factual analysis is
correct, the Laidlaw Court did not have access to her understanding of the scientific issues
related to the toxicity of mercury. The Supreme Court in Laidlaw accepted the district court's
conclusion that the mercury posed no proven risk to the plaintiffs or the environment, and the
Court's standing discussion assumed that the plaintiffs could not prove actual harm from the
mercury. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83.
80 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-83; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 181; Mank, Future
Generations, supra note 75, at 40-41.
81 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183-85; see Craig, supra note 79, at 181; Mank, Future Generations,
supra note 75, at 40-41. ButseeLaidlaw, 528 U.S. at 198-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
plaintiffs should have to piove that defendant's activities actually harmed the environment).
82 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.
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Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs had suffered a sufficient injury
for Article III standing because their reasonable concerns about the
harmfulness of the mercury caused them to discontinue recreational use of
the river.83 The Court treated the loss or diminishment of the plaintiffs'
recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the river as the concrete irnjury.4
Because the diminished recreational or aesthetic enjoyment of the river was
a sufficient concrete injury to the plaintiffs, the Court avoided the more
difficult question of whether the mercury pollution was harmful enough to
the plaintiffs to constitute a concrete injury.84
The Laidlawmajonty distinguished the Court's prior decision in City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons.8 6 Justice Ginsburg summarized Lyons in a manner
strikingly similar to Justice Breyer's subsequent dissent in Sunumers, using
the term "realistic threat" as a way to summarize the standing analysis in
Lyons."' Justice Ginsburg stated, "In Lyons, we held that a plaintiff lacked
standing to seek an injunction against the enforcement of a police chokehold
policy because he could not credibly allege that he faced a realistic threat
from the policy." 8 She continued, "In the footnote from Lyons cited by the
dissent, we noted that '[tihe reasonableness of Lyons' fear is dependent
upon the likelihood of a recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct,' and
that his 'subjective apprehensions' that such a recurrence would even take
place were not enough to support standing. "84 Justice Ginsburg's point that
"[tihe reasonableness of Lyons' fear is dependent upon the likelihood of a
recurrence of the allegedly unlawful conduct"90 is a probabilistic analysis
because "likelihood" is simply one way of asking what is the probability of
an event occurring.
Contrasting the Lyons plaintiffs merely subjective concern that he
might be subject to a: police chokehold in the future, Justice Ginsburg
emphasized that the Laidlaw plaintiffs relied upon "undisputed" evidence
"that Laidlaw's unlawful conduct-discharging pollutants in excess of
permit imt-its-was occurring at the time the complaint was ffled."9' She
acknowledged that there was a subjective issue in Laidlaw about whether
the plaintiffs' avoidance of the river was reasonable, but she concluded that
their concerns were clearly reasonable. 92 She stated,
83 Id at 183-85.
84 Id
85 Craig, supra note 79,' at 181-893; Mank, Standing and Stadqstial Peurons; suprai note 35, at 686.
86 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
87 Compare Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1155-56 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
in Lyons the Court would have found standing had the plaintiff shown "a realistic threat" of
future harm due to reoccurrence of the challenged activity (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 107 n.7
(emphasis omitted))), with Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (stating that the Court found no standing in
Lyons because the plaintiff could not prove a "realistic threat" of harm from the policy); see also
infra Part IV.C (discussing Justice Breyer's dissent in Sumnmes).
88Laidiaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
89 Id (alteration in original) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108 n.8).
90 Id,
91 Id
92 Id at 185.
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Unlike the dissent, we see nothing "improbable" about the proposition that a
company's continuous and pervasive illegal discharges of pollutants into a river
would cause nearby residents to curtail their recreational use of that waterway
and would subject them to other economic and aesthetic harms. The
proposition is entirely reasonable, the District Court found it was true in this
case, and that is enough for injury in fact.93
Implicitly, the Laidlaw decision assessed the probability of harm in
determining that the plaintiffs' fears were reasonable concerns and not
"improbable. "9 4 The Court observed that mercury is "an extremely toxic
pollutant" and that "repeatedly, Laidlaw's discharges exceeded the limits set
by the permit" in determining that the plaintiffs' avoidance of recreational
activities was based on reasonable concerns about potentially harmful
pollution."5 If Laidlaw had been dumping a harmless substance into the river,
it is doubtful that the Court would have found reasonable grounds for
avoiding recreational use of the river. 6 Thus, implicitly, the Court assessed
the probability that the mercury could harm the plaintiffs.
In addressing whether the plaintiffs had standing to seek civil penalties
that would be paid to the United States, the Court concluded that plaintiffs
had standing to seek such penalties because the penalties would "likely"
deter the defendant from comm-itting future violations that could harm the
plaintiffs."7 The Court acknowledged,
[T]here may be a point at which the deterrent effect of a claim for civil
penalties becomes so insubstantial or so remote that it cannot support citizen
standing. The fact that this vanishing point is not easy to ascertain does not
detract from the deterrent power of such penalties in the ordinary case.9
In determining that the penalties would likely deter the defendant from
committing future violations that could harm the plaintiff, the Court
implicitly considered the probability of deterrence.
Although the Laidlaw Court did not use the term "probabilistic
standing," both the Court's reasonable concerns and future deterrent effect
conclusions in the majority opinion were implicitly based on a probabilistic
analysis." Determining whether a concern is "reasonable" or not depends on
how likely a harmful event is to occur, which is a probabilistic
determination.'" Similarly, deciding whether past penalties are likely to
deter future conduct is essentially an exercise in probabilistic prediction.'0 '
93 Id at 184-85.
94 See id, at 18M-5.
95 Id, at 176, 181--83.
96 Mank, Standingan dStatistical Persons, supra note 35, at 686.
97 Laidaw, 528 U.S. at 185-87; Mask, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 41; Mank,
Stan ding and Statistical Peisons, supra note 35, at 732.
98 Laidiaw, 528 U.S. at 186.
99 See id at 184-88.
100 See id at 183-85 (stating that plaintiffs concerns were "reasonable").
101 See id. at 185-87 (stating that civil penalties can deter future violations and thus provide
redress to the citizen).
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Accordingly, probabilistic standing analysis underlies Laidlaw even if the
Court never explicitly used the term "probabilistic standing."
B Justice Scalia 's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice
Thomas,1n argued that "[uln the normal course" plaintiffs must demonstrate
injury both to the environment and themselves to have standing.' He
acknowledged that it was "perhaps possible" for a plaintiff to be injured
even if the environment was not by, for instance, a loss of property value, as
the Laidla w plaintiffs had too vaguely alleged, but "such a plaintiff would
have the burden of articulating and demonstrating the nlature of that
irjury"'O'- burden which he contended the plaintiffs had failed to meet. 05
Additionally, he rejected the majority's subjective reasonable concerns test
as inconsistent with Lyons. Quoting Lyons, he stated, 'Ongoing 'concerns'
about the environment are not enough, for '[iut is the reality of the threat of
repeated injury that is relevant to the standing inquiry, not the plaintiffs
subjective apprehensions. -n116
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argued that the plaintiffs had failed the
redressability requirement of standing because it was too speculative,
contrary to the majority's conclusion that past civil penalties paid by the
defendant would deter future violations by the defendant that might harm
the plaintiffs. 07 As discussed in Part IV, Justice Scalia's skepticism in
Laidlaw about using past penalties to predict future deterrent effect is
analytically similar to his concern in Summers about using past alleged
government violations of the law or past behavior by members of an
organization to predict future injuries. He implicitly rejected probabilistic
standing in Laidlawbefore he explicitly rejected it in Summers.
IV. SUMMERS
In Summers, after the United States Forest Service (Service) approved
the Burnt Ridge Project, the salvage sale of timber on 238 acres of
fire-damaged federal land in the Sequoia National Forest, several
environmental organizations fied suit to enjoin the Service from applying its
regulations exempting salvage sales of less than 250 acres from the notice,
comment, and appeal process that Congress had required the Service to
apply for "more significant land management decisions" and to challenge
other regulations that did not apply to Burnt Ridge.'08 The district court
102 Id at 198 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
103 Idat 199.
104 Id
105 Id at 199-200.
106 Id at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983)).
107 Id at 202, 207-09l.
108 Swnmem;, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1147-48 (2009); see Forest Service Decision Making and
Appeals Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419 (1992), reprinted in
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granted a preliminary injunction against the Burnt Ridge salvage-timber sale
and the parties settled their dispute over that project.'m Despite the
government's argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing as soon as they
settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute, the district court adjudicated the
merits of the plaintiffs' challenges by invalidating five of the Service's
regulations and entering a nationwide injunction against their application."0
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' challenges to regulations not at
issue in the Burnt Ridge Project were not ripe for adjudication, but affirmed
the district court's conclusion that two regulations that were applicable to
the Burnt Ridge Project were contrary to law, and upheld the nationwide
injunction against their application."'
A. Justice Scalia 's Majority Opinion
In Summieis, Justice Scaiia's majority opinion concluded that the
plaintiffs no longer satisfied the injury prong of the standing test once they
settled the Burnt Ridge Project dispute."12 The plaintiffs had initially satisfied
the injury requirement when they submitted an affidavit alleging that
organization member Ara Marderosian had repeatedly visited the Burnt
Ridge site, that he had imminent plans to visit the site again, and that the
government's actions would harm his aesthetic interests in viewing the flora
and fauna at the site."' The settlement, however, had remedied
Marderosian's injury and no other affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs
alleged that the Service's application of the challenged regulations was
causing a particular organization member an imminent injury at a specific
site."14 One affiant, Jim Bensman, asserted that he visited many national
parks, had suffered injury in the past from development on Forest Service
land, and planned to visit several unnamed national forests in the future."15
The Court rejected his affidavit as insufficient because he could not identify
any particular site where he was likely to be harmed by timber sales or other
actions authorized by the challenged regulations.'
In its Suinm ens decision, the Supreme Court for the first time specifically
addressed the question of probabilistic standing based on potential future
injuries to an organization's members."' Several environmental organizations
16 u.s.c. § 1612 note (2006) (requiring the Forest Service to establish a notice, comment, and
appeal process for "proposed actions of the Forest Service concerning projects and activities
implementing land and resource management plans developed under the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974").
109 Summers 129 S. Ct. at 1148.
110 Id,
111 Id.
112 Id at 1149-50.
113 Id at 1149.
114 Id at 1149-51.
115 Id at 1150.
116, Id ("There may be a chance, but is hardly a likelihood, that Bensman's wanderings wl
bring him to a parcel about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations.").
117 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 749.
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challenged the government's sales as harming their members."" The largest
membership organization among the plaintiffs, the Sierra Club, asserted in
its complaint that it has more than "700,000 members nationwide, including
thousands of members in California who use and enjoy the Sequoia National
Forest,""9 and, therefore, that it is likely that the Service's future application
of its challenged regulations would harm at least one of its members.' 20
Justice Scalia's majority opinion rejected the plaintiffs' probabilistic
standing argument because "[tihis novel approach to the law of
organizational standing would make a mockery of our prior cases, which
have required plaintiff-organizations to -make specific allegations establishing
that at least one identified member had suffered or would- suffer harm."'
He maintained that a court cannot rely on an organization's general
assertions about its members' activities, and that the Court's precedent
required an organizational member to ifie an individual affidavit confirming
that he or she uses a specific site that the government is affecting and that
his or her recreational interests will be harmed by the government's alleged
failure to comply with legal requirements. 2 2 The Court observed that its
precedent required individual members of an organization to file affidavits
affirming how each one is harmed or will be imminently harmed by a
challenged activity, unless all members of an organization are harmed by an
activity and that exception was clearly inapplicable. 23
Because federal courts have an independent duty to assess whether
standing exists even if no party challenges standing, the Court reasoned that
an Article 111 court may not accept a plaintiff organization's assertions that
some of its members will probably be harmed by a challenged activity, but
must verify that standing exists by examining affidavits from individual
members that have used particular government lands and have suffered an
i~ury caused by the challenged activity. 24 Justice Scalia argued, "While it is
certainly possible-perhaps even likely--that one individual will meet all of
these [standing] criteria, that speculation does not suffice."' The Court
concluded that none of the timely filed affidavits "establish[ed] that the
afflants' members will ever visit one of the small parcels at issue.' 2 1
Additionally, the majority rejected all late-filed affidavits, introduced by the
plaintiffs after the district court entered its judgment and after they had filed
118 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1147, 1151; accord id at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing the
membership size of the various plaintiff organizations).
119 Id at 1154 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omnitted) (quoting Corrected
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief app. at 34, Earth Island Inst. v. Pengilly,
376 F. Supp. 2d 994 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CIV F-03-6386 JKS)) (listing the membership size of the
various plaintiff organizations).
120 See id
121 Id at 1151 (majority opinion).
122 Id at 1151-52.
123 Id at 1152 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (noting
that the release of member-ship lists affected all organization members)).
124 Id
125 Id at 1152 (emphasis added).
126 Id at 1153.
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a notice of appeal, because the Court concluded that such late
supplementation of the record was inappropriate under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure despite the dissenting opinion's contrary view.' Because it
held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate standing, the Court did not
address the government's contention that the case was not ripe for review or
whether a nationwide injunction would have been appropriate if the
plaintiffs had prevailed. in
B. Justice Kennedy'sF Concuring Opinion
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that he joined
in full the opinion of the Court because a plaintiff can challenge the alleged
violation of a procedural right only if the plaintiff can demonstrate a
separate concrete injury arising from that violation and that the plaintiffs in
the case had failed to prove such a concrete injury. in He observed that ".[this
case would present different considerations if Congress had sought to
provide redress for a concrete injury 'giv[ing] rise to a case or controversy
where none existed before.'"'30 Justice Kennedy concluded that the statute at
issue did not include an express citizen suit provision "indicat[ing] [that]
Congress intended to identify or confer some interest separate and apart
from a procedural right.",13 1
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion read Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion as implying that Congress has the authority to allow probabilistic
organizational standing if a statute, especially one containing a citizen suit
provision, 132 carefully specifies when such an organization may sue.1n Jstc
Breyer observed that if Congress had expressly enacted a statute allowing
standing for parties injured by salvage sales in the past to have standing if
they are likely to use salvage parcels in the future, provided that they have
objected to such sales in the past and will do so in the future, '[tihe majority
127 Id
128 Id
129 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
130 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
131 Id
132 Several citizen suit statutes allow "any person" to sue as a private attorney general.
Eg., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 u.s.c. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2006); Toxic Substances
Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2006); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.c.
§ 1540(g) (2006); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.c. § 1270(a)
(2006); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006); Safe Drinldng
Water Act § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2006); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
§ 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006); see also
Elliott, supra note 35, at 493 & n.160; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at681 & n.81.
133 Summers 129 S. Ct. at 1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To understand the constitutional
issue that the majority decides, it may prove helpful to imagine that Congress enacted a
statutory provisi6n that expressly permidtted environmental groups like the respondents here to
bring cases just like the present one."); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 753.
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cannot, and does not, claim that such a statute would be unconstitutional."'Ln
It is possible that organizations such as Earth Island Institute or the Sierra
Club will lobby Congress to amend statutes to give them standing in similar
cases in the future to test Justice Breyer's interpretation of Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion.'35
C Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer borrowed language from Lyons
in proposing a realistic threat test for determining when an irnjury is
sufficient for standing. 36 Because the "Service sells timber for logging on
'many thousands' of small (250-acre or less) woodland parcels without
following legally required procedures-procedures which, if followed, could
lead the Service to cancel or to modify the sales,"' Justice Breyer's
dissenting opinion argued that the plaintiffs, who collectively have more
than 700,000 members in the United States, had standing because their
members were likely to be affected by the government's allegedly illegal
salvage timber sales in the future.'In He argued that the majority had
acknowledged that the plaintiff organizations had demonstrated that "they
have members who have used salvage-timber parcels in the past"'3.. and that
the Service's unlawful procedures affect those parcels by allowing sales
without the "notice, comment, and appeal procedures required by law," but
that the majority had denied the likelihood that members of these
organizations will be harmed by future salvage sales by imposing'an
unnecessarily restrictive defiitioni of what is an immninent irnjury. 40
Justice Breyer argued that the Court should adopt a realistic approach
to what is an imminent or likely future irnjury.14' He acknowledged that the
Court had "sometimes" used the term "immninent" in its standing decisions, 42
but he argued that the majority had inappropriately used the term to bar
standing in contrast to previous decisions that had used that term to reject
134 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Mank, Standing and Statistical
Per-sons, supra note 35, at 753.
135 Mank, Standing and Sta tistical Persons, supra note 35, at 753.
136 SUinrnerS 129 S. Ct. at 1155-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's approach to
standing is rooted in a "public law" conception of standing that seeks to prevent the Executive
Branch from ignoring congressional directives in statutes addressing matters of public concern,
including public health and the environment, by allowing liberal use of citizen suits to enforce
the law. By contrast, Justice Scalias more limited approach to standing arguably is grounded in
a private law or common law view of the judiciary, which limits courts to adjudicating disputes
involving concrete injuries that would be largely if not entirely recognizable to common law
English judges.
137 Id. at 1153.
138 Id at 1153-55. The plaintiff Sierra Club has more than 700,000 members, Earth Island
institute has over 15,000 members, and the Center for Biological Diversity has over 5000
members in the United States. Id at 1154.
139 Id
140 Id at 1155-56.
141 Id
142 Idat 1155.
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standing only where the alleged harm was "merely 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical' or otherwise speculative."' 43 Justice Breyer contended that the
majority's use of the imminent test was inappropriate where a plaintiff has
"already been subject to the injury it wishes to challenge," as it had in the
case at issue, and "there is a realistic likelihood that the challenged future
conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff."'" In Lyons, the Court had
stated that the plaintiff, who had been subject to an unlawful police
chokehold in the past, "would have had standing had he shown 'a realistic
threat' that reoccurrence of the challenged activity would cause him harm 'in
the reasonably near future."""' Justice Breyer maintained that the Court's
standing precedent required only a realistic threat and did not require a
plaintiff to meet "identification requirements more stringent than the word
'realistic' implies."' Accordingly, although he acknowledged that plaintiffs
could not predict from which specific tracts of fire-damaged land the Service
will sell timber as salvage without following the procedural rules that the
plaintiffs argued are mandatory, he concluded that there was a realistic
threat that a member of the plaintiff organizations will be harmed by a sale
by the Service and, therefore, that the plaintiffs were entitled to standing
under the Court's precedent.'
Justice Breyer argued that the Court had implicitly used a probabilistic
or realistic approach to standing in several other areas of law. He asked,
Would courts deny standing to a holder of a future interest in property who
complains that a life tenant's waste of the land will almost inevitably hurt the
value of his interest-though he will have no personal interest for several years
into the future? Would courts deny standingto a landowner who complains that
a neighbor's upstream dam constitutes a nuisance-even if the harm to his
downstream property (while bound to occur) will not occur for several years?
Would courts deny standing to an injured person seeking a protection order
from future realistic (but nongeographically specific) threats of further attacks? 4 8
Justice Breyer argued that "a threat of future harm may be realistic even
where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times, dates, and GPS
coordinates.' 9 Relying on the Massachusetts v. EPA decision, he reasoned,
"[Wie recently held that Massachusetts has standing to complain of a
procedural failing, namely, EPA's failure properly to determine whether to
restrict carbon dioxide emissions, even though that failing would create
Massachusetts-based harm which (though likely to occur) might not occur
143 Id (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 668.
14 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 752.
145 Sujnmers 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95,107 n.7, 108 (1983)).
146 Id
147 Id at 1156-58; Mank, Standing and Statistical Per sons; supra note 35, at 752-53.
148 Summers, 1295S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149 Id
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for several decades."'50 There has been uncertainty about whether
Massachusetts v. EPAs liberal approach to standing for future injuries
applies only to state plaintiffs or all plaintiffs. 5' If Justice Breyer is correct
that Massachusetts v. EPA's standing analysis for probabilistic future
injuries applies to nonstate plaintiffs,' then Summierss rejection of
probabilistic standing is hard to justify. His dissent, however, commanded
only four of the five members of the Massachusetts v. EPA majority because
Justice Kennedy, who was in the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA in sided
with the majority in Summuers.' Accordingly, it is not clear that a majority of
the Court agrees with Justice Breyer's view that Massachusetts v. EPA
recognized probabilistic standing for nonstate plaintiffs. Yet a future Court
majority that is more sympathetic to probabilistic standing than the current
majority midght use Massachusetts v. EPA as a precedent to expand standing
as Justice Breyer's dissent suggests.
Justice Breyer asserted that the Service's actions in conducting, as the
Service conceded, "thousands of further salvage-timber sales"TM were as
likely to harm the plaintiffs as the examples given in the preceding two
paragraphs and thus constituted a realistic threat deserving of standing
under the Lyons test.TM For example, affiant Bensman stated that he had
visited seventy National Forests and visited some of them hundreds of
time.' 57 Although Beusman's affidavit did not* state " which paicular sites
will be affected" by future Service prjcs" Justice Breyer concluded that
there was a realistic threat that Bensman would be affected by' one of the
thousands of future exempted Service projects that do not follow required
procedural rules. 155 Justice Breyer provided a compelling analogy, stating,
"To know, virtually for certain, that snow will fall in New England this
winter is not to know the name of each particular town where it is bound to
arrive. The law of standing does not require the latter ind of specificity. " '6
Additionally, Justice Breyer argued that the majority had wrongly
excluded the affidavits filed by the plaintiffs after they settled the Burnt
150 Id
151 See Mank, States Standing, supra note 37, at 1746-47 (discussing uncertainties about
whether stan~ding analysis ini Massachusetts v. EPA applies only to states or to all plaintiffs),
Kurz, supra note 71, at 1076-80. Some portion of Massachusetts v. EPA appears to apply to all
procedural plaintiffs, 549 U.S. 497, 517-18 (2007), but the definition and scope of what are
procedural rights is uncertain. See Mank, States Standing supra note 37, at 1727 (arguing the
.some possibility" standard in Massachusetts v. EPA applies to all procedural plaintiffs); id at
1747-52 (arguing the definition and scope of procedural rights exception is uncertain).
152 See Sumnmers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing the majority as including Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer).
154 See supra PartV.B.
155 Summers, 129 S. ct. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 1156-57.
157 Id at 115i7.
158 Id
159 Id
16 Id
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Ridge dispute.""' He argued that the plaintiffs had not seen the need to file
additional affidavits while the Burnt Ridge case was pending because even
the majority agreed that the plaintiffs had standing to bring that case and
that the need for additional affidavits only became apparent when they
settled that dispute." He argued that neither the Constitution nor any
statutes or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited the filing of
additional affidavits, and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d)
empowered a district court judge with liberal discretion to amend a
complaint and hence allow additional affidavits even if one dispute is
settled. 1'The late-filed affidavits identified a number of pending salvage
timber sales in areas that the affiants frequently visited and planned to visit
again in the near ffiture.'A Justice Breyer contended that these affidavits
clearly demonstrated a "'realistic threat' of injury to plaintiffs brought about
by reoccurrence of the challenged conduct-conduct that the Forest Service
thinks lawful and admits wil reoccur."'65
D. Analysis
Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer disagreed about whether, to establish
standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate exactly when and how injury will
follow from the government's allegediy illegal actions as Justice Scalia
maintained for the majority, or that it is enough for a plaintiff to allege
sufficient facts that injury will probably follow from the government actions,
as Justice Breyer argued. The difference in their approaches is shown in the
divergent ways they interpreted and applied Lyons to the facts in Summ er.
According to Justice Scalia, the facts alleged by the plaintiffs in Sumnmers
were weaker than those in Lyons-
The allegations here present a weaker likelihood of concrete harm than that
which we found insufficient in Lyons where a plaintiff who alleged that he had
been injured by an improper police chokehold sought injunctive relief barring
use of the hold in the future. We said it was "no more than conjecture" that
Lyons would be subjected to that chokehold upon a later encounter. Here we
are asked to assume not only that Bensman will stumble across a project tract
unlawfully subject to the regulations, but also that the tract is about to be
developed by the Forest Service in a way that harms his recreational interests,
and that he would have commented on the project but for the regulation.
Accepting an intention to visit the National Forests as adequate to confer
standing to challenge any Government action affecting any portion of those'
forests would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of concrete,
particularized injury in fact.'66
161 Id at 1157-58.
162 Id
163 Id at 1158; FED. R. cw. P. 15(d).
164 Suaunners, 129 S. Ct. at 1157-58.
165 Id
16 Id at 1150 (majority opinion) (citations omnitted).
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Based upon his interpretation that Lyons requires a plaintiff to establish with
certainty that he would be subject to a chokehold, Justice Scalia reasoned
that the Summrers plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an injury because they
could not prove when a member of their organization would be harmed at a
specific site by the government's failure to follow notice and comment
procedures with a particular fire-salvage sale.'
By contrast, Justice Breyer argued that Lyons only required a plaintiff
to demonstrate a realistic threat of future irjury.'8 According to Justice
Breyer, the Summners plaintiffs met his realistic threat test because the facts
alleged by the plaintiffs demonstrated that one of their thousands of
members who regularly used federal forest lands would be harmed in the
reasonably near future by one of the thousands of fire salvage sales
conducted by the Service.'w In particular, it seemed likely that Bensman
would be harmed because he regularly traveled to numerous Service
forest properties. 7
V. EASY CASES
Courts are likely to distinguish Laidlaw from Sumnmeis in cases that are
factually similar to one of those two cases. Thus, in cases in which the
plaintiff alleges that she has ceased to use a river or other recreational area
because of a fear of pollution, courts are likely to follow Laidlaw and find
standing even though the determination of what are reasonable concerns is
likely to involve to some extent an assessment of probabilistic harm.7
On the other hand, if an organizational plaintiff argues that allegedly illegal
government actions are likely to harm its members in the future, but there
are no allegations of current harms or lost recreational activities, then
Summers will control *and the court will find no standing.7 12 Some
pre-Summaeis cases had suggested that courts are more willing to find
probabilistic standing in environmental cases than in nonenvironmental
cases, but that distinction is now no longer tenable in light of Summers.'73
A. Lower Court Decisions Relying on Laidlaw to Recognize
Probabilistic Standing
As discussed in this Part, three courts of appeals decisions factually
similar to Laidlaw have recognized standing for threatened or probabilistic
injuries. In each of these cases there was some present pollution and some
change in the plaintiffs' recreational activities in light of that pollution. Thus,
even after Sumnmers, the Supreme Court would likely find standing in each of
167 Id
168 Id at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Id at 1156-58.
170 Idat 1157.
171 See infra part V.A.
172 See Ara Part V.B.
173 See ifraPart V.C.
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these cases, although the Court might disagree with some of the courts of
appeals' language regarding probabilistic standing.
In Fliends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp. (Gaston
Copper),"' the plaintiff alleged that he swam and fished in a lake less often
than before because of his concern about the defendant's discharge of
pollution into the lake."' The Fourth Circuit in an en banc decision
concluded that the plaintiff "has plainly demonstrated injury in fact" because
"[h]e has produced evidence of actual or threatened iijuryto a waterway in
which he has a legally protected interest."16 The court interpreted Laidlawto
allow standing where a plaintiff has reasonable concerns about a
probabilistic injury and stated, "The Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that threatened rather than actual injury can satisfy Article III
standing requirements .... Threats or increased risk thus constitutes
cognizable harm. Threatened environmental injury is by nature probabilistic.",7 7
In Ecological Rights Foundation v. Pacific Lumber Co., the Ninth
Circuit recognized that a plaintiff may demonstrate an injury in fact if the
defendant's actions increase the. probability that the plaintiff will suffer
future injury."'7 Several plaintiffs alleged that they had regularly swam or
fished in Yager Creek, but further alleged that they had stopped or
diminished these recreational activities because of their fears about the
harmfulness of the defendant's pollution of the Creek."'7 Citing Laidlaw and
Gaston Copper, the Ecological Rights Foundation decision stated that a
plaintiffs reasonable concerns about an increased risk of harm from a
defendant's activities is sufficient for standing.'" Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit stated that a plaintiff could obtain standing to reduce the risk of
future pollution even if no actual harm had occurred yet:
The Clean Water Act ... not only regulates actual water pollution, but embodies
a range of prophylactic, procedural rules designed to reduce the risk of
pollution. It is not necessary for a plaintiff challenging violations of rules
174 204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
175 Id. at 156; Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 42; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 687.
176 Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 156 (emphasis added); see also Craig, supra note 79, at 191 &
n.207; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 41-42; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 687.
177 Gaston Copper, 204 F.3d at 160 (emphasis added); accord Ecological Rights Found,
230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gaston Copper with approval); Craig, supra note 79,
at 191 (discussing Gaston Copper as recognizing that increased risk is enough to provide
standing for plaintiff); Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 41; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 687.
178 Ecological Rights Found, 230 F.3d at 1151-52; Craig, supra note 79, at 191-92; Mank, Future
Generations, supra note 75, at 42; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 688.
179 Ecological Rights Found, 230 F.3d at 1144-45, 1150-52.
180 Id at 1152; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 42-43; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 688.
112 [Vol. 40:89
A "REALISTIC ThIREA T" OFHARM
designed to reduce the risk of pollution to show the presence of actual
pollution in order to obtain standing."
The Ninth Circuit's argument that standing is possible to avoid future
harm even if there is no actual harm yet is arguably consistent with the
underlying reasoning supporting Laidlaw's reasonable concerns and
deterrent effect conclusions." The Summers decision, however, suggests
that prophylactic standing is only possible if the future harm is imminent. i
Furthermore, the First Circuit has recognized that a plaintiff has
standing if a defendant's actions present a realistic threat of a probabilistic
near-term harm.'" In Maine People's Allance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,t" the
First Circuit determined that the citizen suit provision of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).' "allows citizen suits when there is
a reasonable prospect that a serious, near-term threat to human health or the
environment exists."" The court explained that "[iut is the threat that must
be close at hand, even if the perceived harm is not."" Providing an example,
the decision observed that "if there is a reasonable prospect that a
carcinogen released into the environment today may cause cancer twenty
years hence, the threat is near-term even though the perceived harm will
only occur in the distant future."'" The plaintiffs alleged that they stopped
eating fish or shellfish from the Penobscot River and avoided recreating in
the River because of their fear of harm from the defendant's mercury
discharges. 0 Rejecting the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs must provide
evidence of actual environmental harm, the First Circuit determined that
"probabilistic harms are legally cognizable, and the district court made a
supportable finding that a sufficient probability of harm exists to satisfy the
Article III standing inquiry."' The First Circuit's "reasonable prospect" test
is based upon and arguably consistent with LaidlaWs reasonable concerns
181 Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 1152 n.12; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 192;
Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 43.
182 Mank, Standing and Stalstical Persons, supra note 35, at 688.
183 See Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-53 (2009) (adopting narrow definition of what is an
imminent injury).
184 Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 43-44; Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 688.
185 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006).
186 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006)
(amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965)).
187 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 (emphasis added); see also Craig, supra note 79,
at 193; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 43; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 681-82 & n.81.
188 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 n.1 (emphasis added); see also Craig, supra note 79,
at 193; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 43; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 681-82 & n.81.
189 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 279 n.1; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 193; Mank,
Future Generations, supra note 75, at 43; Mank, Standing and Statistcal Persons, supra note 35,
at 681-82 & n.81.
190 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 284.
191 Id. at 283-84; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 193; Mank, Future Generations, supra
note 75, at 43; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 681-82 & n.81.
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test. The Summers majority, however, might be troubled by characterizing
an injury "twenty years hence" as an imminent one."
The First Circuit interpreted Laidlaw's reasonable concerns standing
test to require the plaintiffs to prove a realistic threat of harm, which is the
same test that Justice Breyer subsequently proposed in his Summers
dissenting opinion.'" The court stated,
Still, neither a bald assertion of such a harm nor a purely subjective fear that an
environmental hazard may have been created is enough to ground standing.
Rather, an individual's decision to deny herself aesthetic or recreational
pleasures based on concern about pollution will constitute a cognizable injury
only when the concern is premised upon a realistic threat.""
The probabilistic approach of the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits is similar
in many ways to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Summers, especially
the First Circuit's use of the same realistic threat test.' 5 Nevertheless, a
majority of the current Supreme Court might affirm the result in these three
cases as consistent with Laidlaw because the facts of these cases are
comparable; they all involved plaintiffs who alleged that they avoided
recreational activities in a river because they feared harm from pollution
dumped in the river by the defendant. Some Justices who joined the
Summers majority might accept the standing determination in the three
decisions, but also dismiss those three decisions' approval of probabilistic
standing as unnecessary dicta that is no longer valid in light of the
Summers decision.'6
B. Cases Similar to Summers
As will be discussed below, before the Court decided Summers, a panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit similarly rejected an organization's
standing claims based upon the probability of future injuries to its members.
In Publc Citizen v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(Pubic Citizen 1),'9 the court suggested that probabilistic injuries are never
sufficient for constitutional standing.'" The court conceded that the Circuit
192 Me. People's Aiance, 471 F.3d at 279 n.1; see Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-53 (2009)
(adopting a narrow definition of what is an imminent injury).
193 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 284; Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156-58 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (proposing realistic threat test for what constitutes sufficient injury for standing);
see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 44; Mank, Standing and Stastical Persons,
supra note 35, at 681-82 n.81.
194 Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 284.
195 Compare Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1156-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing realistic
threat test for what constitutes sufficient injury for standing), with Me. People's Alliance,
471 F.3d at 284 (interpreting Laidlaw's reasonable concerns standing test to require the
plaintiffs to prove a realistic threat of harm).
196 Sumers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151-53 (rejecting dissent's theory of probabilistic standing).
197 489 F.3d 1279 (2007), modified on reh'g, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
198 Id. at 1291-99; see also Pub. Citizen v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Publc Citizen Hl),
513 F.3d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiamn); Mank, Piture Generadons supra note 75, at 49-50;
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in a few previous cases had allowed standing in decisions involving
probabilistic future irjuries, but strongly implied that standing in such cases
violated separation of powers principles by intruding on the role of the
political branches.'" The three-judge panel encouraged the Circuit to sit as
an en banc court in a future case to address whether probabilistic standing
should be prohibited.2" The Summers decision has partially answered that
question by stating that organizational standing based upon probabilistic
injuries is inappropriate, but, as Part VI.C argues, that decision did not
resolve all issues concerning probabilistic standing.20 1
Public Citizen alleged that its members had an increased risk of future
injury from an automobile accident because the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration's (NHTSA) standards for tire pressure monitors were
less stringent than the alternative requirements that Public Citizen had
proposed."n In 2000, Congress enacted the Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD Act)2" to
require new tire safety requirements.2 ' The TREAD Act required the
Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations mandating new vehicles to
include a warning system "to indicate to the operator when a tire is
significantly under inflated."20 5
In 2005, NHTSA promulgated a final rule regulating tire safety: Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 138.206 Standard 138 requires automakers to
install tire pressure monitoring systems that warn drivers "when the
pressure in the vehicle's tires is approaching a level at which permanent tire
damage could be sustained as a result of heat buildup and tire failure is
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 673; Cassandra Sturlde & Suzanne
Logan, FurtherDevelopmentsin the D.C Circuit'sArticle lStandingAnalysis Are Environmental
Cases Safe from the Court's Deepening Skepticism of Increased-Risk-of-Ham Claims?, 38 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,460, 10,464, 10,470 (2008) (arguing that the two Public Citizen
decisions seek to severely limit or eliminate probabilistic standing claims).
199 Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1291-92; Public Citizen I, 513 F.3d at 237; Mank, Standing
and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 679-84; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,467.
200 Publc Citizen ll 513 F.3d at 241; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 669; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,466.
201 See infra Part V.C (questioning Summes's rejection of probabilistic reasoning).
202 Puble Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1291; Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 49; Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 707; Sturlde & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,464.
203 Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
204 See id; see also Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 49; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 707.
205 Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act § 13,
49 U.S.C. § 30123 (2006); see also Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 49; Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 707-08; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at
10,464.
206 See Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,136, 18,136 (Apr. 8, 2005) (codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585); Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,079, 53,079
(Sept. 7, 2005) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585) ("The petitions for reconsideration are
granted in part and denied in part, and through this document, we are amending the standard
and related provisions accordingly."); Mank, Future Generations; supra note 75, at 49.
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possible.""o' Public Citizen, four individual tire manufacturers, and the Tire
Industry Association filed petitions for review in the D.C. Circuit that
challenged Standard 138 for four alleged deficiencies: 1) the absence of a
requirement that pressure monitors be compatible with all replacement
tires, 2) the up to twenty-minute delay between significant under inflation
and the illumination of the dashboard warning light, 3) the use of the
twenty-five percent below-placard-pressure standard for under inflation, and
4) the testing that NHTSA required for pressure monitors.2 M
1. Public Citizen I
The first Publc Citizen decision was critical concerning Public Citizen's
claim of organizational standing based on future probabilistic injuries to its
members, but a majority of the court allowed Public Citizen to file
supplemental briefs to address whether Standard 138 demonstrably and
imminently increased the probability that its members would be injured in a
traffic accident.2" The court recognized that Public Citizen had
demonstrated a "concrete" and "particularized" injury because "[i]njuries
from car accidents are particularized-each person who is in an accident is
harmed personally and distinctly" and they are concrete even if many other
persons suffer similar injuries.21 Similar to the subsequent Summers
decision, the Public Citizen Icourt, however, doubted that Public Citizen's
alleged injuries were "actual or imminent" because. Public Citizen raised only
"remote and speculative claims of possible future harm to its members."2 1'
The court questioned whether the future traffic injuries alleged by Public
Citizen were imminent:
[N]o one can say who those several hundred individuals are out of the 300
million people in the United States, nor can anyone say when such accidents
might occur. For any particular individual, the odds of such an accident
occurring are extremely remote and speculative, and the time (if ever) when
any such accident would occur is entirely uncertain.21
Additionally, similar to the reasoning in the Summers decision, the
Public Citizen I court stated that Public Citizen could not achieve
207 Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. at 18,148; see also Mank, 1uture
Generations, supra note 75, at 49; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708.
208 Puble Citizen 4 489 F.3d at 1286; see also Mank, Fture Generations, supra note 75, at 49;
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708.
209 Puble Citizen 4 489 F.3d at 1291-98; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 50-52; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,464-65.
210 Puble Citizen 4 489 F.3d at 1292-93; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 708; Sturlde & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,464.
211 Public Citizen 4 489 F.3d at 1293-95; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 708-09; Sturlde & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,464.
212 Publc Citizen 4 489 F.3d at 1293-94; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 50; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708-09; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,464.
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organizational standing by aggregating the probabilistic claims of its
members, stating, "Nor does it help Public Citizen to aggregate a series of
remote and speculative claims."213 The fact that Public Citizen had 130,000
members did not help its standing case. The court stated,
Under the Supreme Court's precedents, it therefore does Public Citizen no good
to string together 130,000 remote and speculative claims rather than one
remote and speculative claim. Each claim is still remote and speculative, which
under the Supreme Court's precedents is an impermissible basis for our
exercising the judicial power.14
The Public Citizen Icourt stated that the political branches rather than
the courts should decide claims of probabilistic harm:
To the extent Congress is concerned about Executive under-regulation or
under-enforcement of statutes, it also may exercise its oversight role and power
of the purse.... The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that disputes about
future events where the possibility of harm to any given individual is remote
and speculative are properly left to the policymnaking Branches, not the
Article III courts. 21 5
The court reasoned that judicial recognition of probabilistic harm cases
was improper because "virtually any citizen-because of a fractional chance
of benefit from alternative action-would have standing to obtain judicial
review of the agency's choice" and recognition of such claims would open
the floodgates to judicial challenges of almost all executive actions. 16 The
recognition of probabilistic claims, the court explained,
would drain the "actual or imminent" requirement of meaning in cases
involving consumer challenges to an agency's regulation (Qr lack of regulation);
would expand the "proper-and properly limited"-constitutional role of the
Judicial Branch beyond deciding actual cases or controversies; and would
entail the Judiciary exercising some part of the Executive's responsibility to
take care that the law be faithfully executed.17
213 Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1294; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 709.
214 Piblic Citizen 1d489 F.3d at 1294; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 50;
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708-09.
215 Public Citizen 1;489 F.3d at 1295.
216 Id; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 51; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 709; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,464-65.
217 ublc Ctizn . 489 F.3d at 1295 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Maak,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 709-10. But see Brown, supra note 56, at 274-75
(arguing the "Take Care" clause in Article 11 of the Constitution does not give the President
discretion to ignore legal requirements, but requires the President to obey the law); Mary M.
Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison,
Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253,
275 (2003) (asserting that the "Take Care" clause imposes a duty on the President, rather than
conferring a power).
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Thus, the court concluded, "[allowing a party to assert such remote
and speculative claims to obtain federal court jurisdiction threatens... to
eviscerate the Supreme Court's standing doctrine."2 8 Public Citizen I
adopted a narrow approach regarding when prospective risks are
sufficiently substantial to qualify as an "immninent" risk pursuant to the
Supreme Court's standing test: "We have allowed standing when there was
at least both (i) a substantiaLly increased risk of harm and (ii) a substantial
probability of harm with that increase taken into account. "2 19
The Public Citizen I decision rejected Professor Cass Sunstein's
proposal that an "'increased risk' is ilseffconcrete, particularized, and actual
injury for standing purposes."220 The court objected, stating,
First, the mere increased risk of some event occurring is utterly abstract-not
concrete, direct, real, and palpable. Second, increased risk falls on a population
in an undifferentiated and generalized manner; everyone in the relevant
population is hit with the same dose of risk, so there is no particularization....
Third, the Supreme Court has said that, in temporal terms, there are three kinds
of harm-actual harms, imminent harms, and potential future harms that are
not imminent. Treating the increased risk of future harm as an actual harm,
however, would eliminate these categories. Under this approach, possible
future injuries, whether or not they are imminent, would magically become
concrete, particularized, and actual injuries merely because they could occur.
That makes no sense, except as a creative way to end-run the Supreme Court's
221
standing precedents.
The Public Citizen I decision's view that potential futu re harms are not
actual or immninent harms is similar to the reasoning in the subsequent
Summers majority opinion. Despite its strong implication that Public
Citizen's claim of potential future inijuries from the challenged tire standards
could not meet standing requirements, a majority of the Public Citizen I
court allowed Public Citizen to file supplemental submissions to
determine if any of the organization's members had suffered injuries
sufficient for standing.22
218 Public Citizen 1, 489 F. 3d at 1294; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 3t5, at 710. But see Brown, s~upra note 56, at 274-75; Cheh, supra note 217, at 275.
219 Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1295 (citing Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman,
92 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 710; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,460, 10,465 (arguing the First Circuit's
two-part substantial probability test is more stringent than the test used in other circuits).
220 Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1297 (citing Sunstein, supra note 37, at 228); see also Mank,
Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 710-11, 732 ("[C] ourts should treat statistical
injuries as sufficiently concrete for standing as long as the increased risk of serious hrm... is
at least one in one million.").
221 Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1297-98 (citations omitted); see also Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 711; Sturlde & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,465.
222 Puiblic Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1296-98; see also Mank, Pluture Generations, supra note 75,
at 50-52; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 708. Although he
acknowledged that the circuit's precedent gave a court the discretion to supplement the record,
Judge Sentelle opposed the portion of the majority's decision allowing Public Citizen to
supplement the record because he concluded that they had failed to demonstrate standing and
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2. Public Citizen II
After the litigants submitted supplemental briefs, the D.C.. Circuit in
Publc Cidzen v. National lbghway Traffic Safety Administration (Public
Citizen l)m held in a per curiam opinion that Public Citizen did not have
standing.24 The court concluded that Public Citizen's statistical analysis
failed to demonstrate that its members were at a demonstrable and
imnuinent increased risk of traffic injuries from Standard 138 compared to
Public Citizen's alternative proposalsn5 First, Public Citizen was not able to
quantify the number of excess injuries caused by Standard 138's use of a
twenty-minute lag time between underinflation of a tire and the activation of
a dashboard warning light compared to Public Citizen's one-minute lag time
proposaln6 Additionally, Public Citizen's statistical calculations improperly
included recalled tires and tires subject to safety programs that are more
likely to suffer from structural defects than tire pressure problems.
The Public Citizen Hmajority implied that courts should deny standing
in any case alleging probabilistic injury, but they acknowledged that a panel
decision could not prohibit suits based upon probabilistic standing in light of
the Circuit's prior decisions in Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
GLiCkman (Mountain States) 228 and NRDC 12 which had both allowed
probabilistic standing in some circumstances.m  The Public Citizen H
majority observed, "[i]f we were deciding this case based solely on the
Supreme Court's precedents, we would agree with the separate opinion,"
which completely rejected standing based on probabilistic injuries.23' The
Pubc Citizen H majority conceded that "[a]s we read our decisions in
therefore the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1299
(Sentelle, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
223 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
224 Id. at 241; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 52; Mank, Standing and
StatisticalPersons, supra note 35, at 711; Sturlde & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,465.
225 Public Citizen If 513 F.3d at 238-41; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 52; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 711; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,465-66.
226 Public Citizen IT 513 F.3d at 239-40; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 52; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 711; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,466.
227 Public Citizen IT 513 F.3d at 240; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 52; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 711; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,466.
228 92 F.3d 1228, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (recognizing standing for plaintiffs who challenged the
Forest Service's plan to prohibit logging in a national forest because the plan would increase the
probability of a catastrophic fire by permitting fuel to accumulate in dead trees).
229 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (recognizing standing where members of an organization
had an increased risk of one in 129,000 or one in 200,000 of developing skin cancer because of
government exemptions for methyl bromide).
230 See Public Citizen J2 513 F.3d at 241; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75,
at 46-48; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 712; Sturkie & Logan, supra
note 198, at 10,466.
231 Public Citizen 11 513 F.3d at 241; see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 52;
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 665.
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Mountain States and [ NRDC IA], however, 'this Court has not closed the door
to all increased-risk-of-harm cases.' 23 ' The three-judge panel encouraged the
D.C. Circuit to address the legality of probabilistic standing in an en banc
decision: "In an appropriate case, the en banc Court may have to consider
whether or how the Mountain States principle should apply to general
consumer challenges to safety regulations."'33 Until an en banc court decided
that question, the Public Citizen Hf majority concluded that it would apply a
stringent standard of proof in cases in which a plaintiff sought standing
based upon probabilistic injuries because "'the constitutional requirement of
imminence as articulated by the Supreme Court' requires 'a very strict
understanding of what increases in risk and overall risk levels' will support
injury in fact.",13
In his separate concurring opinion in Public Citizen H,4 Judge Sentelle
asserted that Article III federal courts should reject probabilistic standing
because of separation of powers principles:
As the majority noted in the earlier iteration of this litigation, the probabilistic
approach to standing now being applied in increased-risk cases expands the
"'proper-and properly limnited'-constitutional role of the Judicial Branch
beyond deciding actual cases or controversies; and... entail[s] the Judiciary
exercising some part of the Executive's responsibility to take care that the law
be faithfully executed."
... The majority's discussion today illustrates the ill fit between judicial
power and that sort of future event and possible harm. The wide-ranging, near-
merits discussion at the standing threshold is the sort of thing that
congressional committees and executive agencies exist to explore. The judicial
process is constitutionally designed for cases or controversies involving actual
or imminent harm to identified persons-that is, the persons who have
standing. If we do not soon abandon this idea of probabilistic harm, we will find
ourselves looking more and more like legislatures rather than courts.2
232 Publi Citizen H, 513 F.3d at 241 (quoting Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir.
2007), modified on reh'g, 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. dir. 2008) (per curiam)); see also Mank, Future
Generations, supra note 75, at 53; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 700.
233 Publi Citizen 1, 513 F.3d at 241; see also Mank, Fliture Generations, supra note 75, at 53;
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons supra note 35, at 700; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198,
at 10,466. Public Citizen will apparently not seek en banc review because it fears that an en
banc court might hold that standing may never be based on future injuries. Dawn Reeves & Lara
Beaven, Key Court Eyes New Bid to Limit Standing in Suits Against EPA, ExpertS Say, INSIDE
E. P.A. WKLY. REP., Jan. 25, 2008, at 1, 9.
234 Pujblic Citizen 11, 513 F.3d at 241 (quoting Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1296); see also
Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 53-54; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 710; Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,466-67.
235 Publi Citizen JI, 513 F.3d at 242 (Senteile, J., concurring) (quoting Public Citizen 1, 489
F.3d at 1295); see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 52-53; Mank, Standing and
Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 709-10;1 Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198. at 10,466-67.
But see Brown, supra note 56, at 274-75 (arguing the "Take Care" clause in Article 11 of the
Constitution does not give the President discretion to ignore legal requirements, but requires
the President to obey the law); Cheh, supra note 217, at 275.
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3. Comparing Summers with Public Citizen
In some ways, the Public Citizen decisions anticipated the reasoning in
Summers by rejecting organizational standing based upon the probability
that some of the organization's members will be harmed in the future.ni Both
the Public Citizen decisions and the Summers decision reasoned that
potential future injuries to unknown members of an organization fail to meet
the Court's test for what constitutes an imminent injury.23 The Public Citizen
court went further than Summers by suggesting that probabilistic standing
claims ralsed serious separation of powers concerns and that the political
branches were better suited to address claims that current government
actions might increase the risk of injury to large population groups in the
fuiture. m8 In his Lujan opinion, Justice Scalia had argued that the standing
doctrine's requirement that a plaintiff have a concrete injury advanced
separation of powers principles by limiting the judiciary to actual cases and
controversies and leaving all other disputes involving the public interest to
the political branches. 3 In his Summers opinion, however, Justice Scalia
avoided the separation of powers implications of probabilistic organizational
standing, unlike the Public Citizen decisions. Perhaps the Summers majority
believed that those issues were unnecessary for the resolution of the case.
Another possibility is that other members of the majority disagreed with
portions of Justice Kennedy's solo concurring opinion, which emphasized
the broad role of Congress in defining what constitutes an injury for
standing purposes, and, therefore, the majority could not agree upon the
broader constitutional implications of the case. 4
C Envirnental Versus Non en vironmenta] Injries
Before the Court decided Summers, some lower court decisions had
suggested that probabilistic standing may be appropriate in environmental
cases, but not in nonenvironmental cases.24' In Center for Law & Education
v. Department of Education, 24 2 a panel of the D.C. Circuit stated, "Outside of
increased exposure to environmental harms, hypothesized 'increased risk'
has never been deemed sufficient 'injury. ,,2' Because the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate any increased risk of harm from the government's alleged
236 Compare Public Citizen 11 513 F.3d at 241 (questioning constitutionality of probabilistic
standing), and Public Citizen 1 489 F.3d at 1293-98, with Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1149-53
(2009) (rejecting constitutionality of probabilistic organizational standing by adopting a narrow
definition of what is an iminrent injury).
237 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149-53 (holding possible future iNjuries to unknown members of
an organization fail to meet the Court's definition of what is an imminent injury for standing);
Public Citizen 1J 513 F.3d at 241; Public Citizen 1, 489 F.3d at 1293-98.
238 Public Citizen ff 513 F.3d at 241; Public CitizenI 1489 F.3d at 1293-98.
239 Ltuan, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).
240 See Summers, 1295S. ct. at 1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring); supra Part IV.B.
241 Sturkie & Logan, supra note 198, at 10,470-71.
242 396 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
243 Id at 1161.
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failure to include educational advocacy groups as members on a negotiated
rulemaking commnittee, the court did not have to answer whether it is ever
possible for nonenvironmental probabilistic injuries to be sufficient for
Article El standing."M In his concurring opinion, Judge Harry Edwards agreed
that the plaintiff did not meet the Supreme Court's test for standing because
she "failed to establish any causal relationship between the substantive
Government decision that she desires and a concrete, personal interest. "245
He contended, however, that in procedural cases it is possible for a
nonenvironental plaintiff to establish standing based upon an increased
risk of injUry.21
In Virginia State Corp Cormission v Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (Virginia SCC), 247 a panel of the D.C. Circuit implied in dicta
that it agreed with Center for Law & Education's distinction between
standing in environmental and nonenviromental cases, stating that
" [o] utside the realm of environmental disputes . .. we have suggested that a
claim of increased risk or probability cannot suffice."m The Virgiia SCC
decision acknowledged that there was a conflict among the circuits about
probabilistic standing.2 9 Because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the
government's actions had injured them, the court did not have to decide the
issue of probabilistic standing.250
Before the Summners decision, there was a plausible argument that
courts had been more willing to allow probabilistic standing in
environmental cases than nonenvironmental cases. The First, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuit decisions discussed in Part V.A, as well as the NRDC HI and
Mountain States decisions mentioned in Part V.B, recognized probabilistic
standing in cases relating to environmental issues. Additionally, Pujblc
Citizen rejected probabilistic standing in a nonenvironmental decision and
did not address whether a different type of analysis midght be appropriate in
environmental cases, although it seems doubtful that the court would have
accepted an exception for environmental cases in light of its strong rejection
of probabilistic standing.25' Summeis, however, clearly rejected probabilistic
standing in an environmental case. 25
After Sumnmers, a court may not openly recognize probabilistic
standing, except perhaps in a case involving avoided recreational activities
that relies upon Laidlaw.' Nevertheless, the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuit
decisions correctly interpreted Laidlaw to implicitly allow probabilistic
standing in cases where plaintiffs allege that their reasonable concerns
244 Id
245 Id at 1167-68 (Edwards, J., concurring).
246 Id at 1166-67..
247 468 F.3d 845 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
248 Id at 848; see also Mank, Standing and Statisical Peisons, supra note 35, at 716; Sturlde
& Logan, supra note 198, at 10,463.
249 Virgina SC(], 468 F.3d at 848.
250 Id. at 848-49.
251 See supra Part V.B.
252 See supra Part Iv.A.
253 See supra Parts lIlIA, IVA,~ infra Part VI.C.
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about the impact of pollution lead them to avoid recreational activities.as
Where there is both some present pollution and a present change in
recreational activities, Laidlaw implies that a court may find standing even
though the plaintiffs primary concern is the probability that harm will occur
in the future.z As is discussed in Part VI.C, in the future, plaintiffs may seek
to avoid Summers and fall within LaidlaWs scope by manipulating the facts
of a case to include claims of lost recreational activities.256
VI. A HARD CASE: NATUR4L RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL V. EPA
The D.C. Circuit's decision in NRDCHis the strongest case supporting
probabilistic standing25 ' Because there was strong statistical and risk
assessment evidence in NRDC 17 demonstrating that the government's
exemption of methyl bromide pollution would cause several lifetime skin
cancer cases among NRDC's membership, there was a far stronger case of
injury than in either Summers or Laidlaw, which involved aesthetic and
recreational injuries. Yet if the case had been decided after Summers, the
NRDCHcourt arguably should have denied standing because it is impossible
to know which members of the plaintiff organization would develop skin
cancer.2w Because recreational activities were not at issue in NRDC IH the
relaxed Laidlaw framework does not apply.2 8 If neither Summers nor
Laidlaw would recognize standing on the facts of the compelling NRDC H
decision, then it is time for the Court to revise its standing test to determine
when there is a realistic threat of harm. 6'
A. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, I andlI
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency(NRDCI), 62 the plaintiff NRDC challenged a final rule issued by EPA
that exempted for the year 2005 "critical" agricultural uses of the otherwise
banned chemical methyl bromide, which destroys stratospheric ozone.263
NRDC argued that the rule violated the United States's treaty obligations
254 See supra Part V.A.
255 See supra Parts HIA, IV.A; infra Part VI.C.
256 See infra Part VI.C.
257 See Mank, Pture Generations, supra note 75, at 47-48; Mank, Standing and Statistcal
Persons, supra note 35, at 705-07.
258 See infra Part VIA.
259 See Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009) (rejecting standing based on statistical
probability that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future).
260 See infra Part VI.C.
261 See infra Parts VI.C, VII.
262 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting standing), withdrawn, NRDC 1, 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding NRDC had standing because two to four of their members would likely get skin
cancer from the government's exemptions for methyl bromide, a chemical that destroys ozone).
263 Id. at 478-80; see 40 C.F.R. § 82.4(p) (2008); Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process
for Exempting Critical Uses from the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 76,982, 76,990
(Dec. 23, 2004) (exempting certain "critical uses" of methyl bromide for 2005); Mank, Fture
Generations, supra note 75, at 47; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 702.
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under the 1987 Montreal Protocol, which requires signatory nations to phase
out and eventually ban chemicals that destroy stratospheric ozone,2 4 and
also violated provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) 265 that implement the
Protocol."' NRDC argued that the exemptions in the final rule were greater
than required to comply with genuinely critical U.S. uses.
NRDC asserted that it had standing because the exemptions would
increase its members' risk of developing skin cancer or cataracts because
the exempted methyl bromide would destroy some stratospheric ozone,
which protects human beings by absorbing most dangerous ultraviolet
radiation from the Sun so that dangerously high levels never reach the
surface of the Earth .2  NRDC substantiated its standing allegations by
submitting an affidavit from Dr. Sasha Madronich, who stated that "it is
reasonable to expect more than 10 deaths, more than 2,000 non-fatal skin
cancer cases, and more than 700 cataract cases to result from the
16.8 million pounds of new production and consumption allowed by the 2005
exemption rule." 5 EPA conceded that NRDC had standing and did not
challenge Dr. Madronich's assumptions.270
1. NRDC I
In NRDC I the D.C. Circuit held that NRDC did not have standing to
petition the court to review the final rule because the annualized risk to
members of NRDC was too remote and hypothetical to meet the injury in
fact portion of the standing test."' Understanding Dr. Madronich's affidavit
as estimating deaths over the next 145 years and spread among the entire
264 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29; see also Cassandra Sturkie & Nathan H. Seltzer,
Developments in the D.C. Circuit's Article IHI Standing Analysis. When is an Increased Risk of
Fture Harm Sufficient to Constitute Inyury-in-Fact in Environmental Cases., 37 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,287, 10,291 (2007).
265 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
266 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, 104 Stat. 2399, 2648-72
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671-7671q (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h) (2006) ("[EPA]
shall promulgate rules for reductions in, and terminate the production, importation, and
consumption of, methyl bromide under a schedule that is in accordance with, but not more
stringent than, the phaseout schedule of the Montreal Protocol Treaty as in effect on October
21, 1998."); see also Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 47; Mank, Standing and
StatisticalPersons, supra note 35, at 702; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,291.
267 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 480; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 702; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
268 NRDC 440 F.3d at 481-82; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Peisons, supra note 35,
at 702; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
269 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 481; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 702-03; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
270 Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292 n.89 ("In its merits brief, EPA stated that it
'believes that Petitioner has satisfied the requirements for Article III standing.'");
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 703.
271 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 48:-4; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 200-01; Mank, Puture
Generations, supra note 75, at 47; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 703;
Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292-93.
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American population of 293-million persons, the D.C. Circuit concluded that
"[w]ith ten more skin cancer deaths in 145 years, the probability of fatality
from EPA's rule comes to 1 in 4.2 bilion per person per year."272 Among the
NRDC's 490,000 members, the court observed that the risk of death was
"infinitesimal": one death in approximately 12,000 years. 73 Additionally, the
court determined that the "other risks" were "similarly small"-"a 1 in
21 million chance of contracting non-fatal skin cancer and a 1 in 61 million
chance of getting a cataract over the next 145 years."' The court concluded
that the injury was insufficient to meet the Circuit's substantial probability
test because an injury must be more than a "'non-trivial' chance of injury."27
The NRDC I decision criticized the concept of probabilistic standing.
The court stated,
Among those which fit least well are purely probabilistic injuries.
Environmental or public health injuries, for example, may have complex
etiologies that involve the interaction of many discrete risk factors. The chance
that one may develop cancer can hardly be said-to be an "actual" injury-the
harm has not yet come to pass. Nor is it "imminent" in the sense of
temporal proximity. 276
The court rejected the implications in decisions by the Second, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits, that any "increase in probability itself constitutes an 'actual
or imminent' inury."277 The court concluded "the law of this circuit is that an
increase in the likelihood of harm may constitute injury in fact only if the
increase is sufficient to 'take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical.' 2
2. NRDC II
NRDC petitioned for a rehearing on the grounds that the court had
miscalculated the risk of the methyl bromide exemption to its members by
mistakenly assuming that the harms "were spread over 145 years" rather
than the lifetimes of its current members."9 Because methyl bromide has a
short atmospheric lifetime, NRDC argued that almost all the harms resulting
272 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 481; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 703; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
273 NRDC J 440 F.3d at 481-82; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 703; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
274 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 482 n.8; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra
note 35, at 703; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,292.
275 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 483 (quoting Mountain States, 92 F.3d 1228, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1996));
see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 703; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra
note 264, at 10,292-93.
276 NRDC 1 440 F.3d at 483; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 703; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
277 NRDC1 440 F.3d at 483-84; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 704; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
278 NRDC1 440 F.3d at 484 (quoting Mountain States, 92 F.3d at 1234-35).
279 Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 8-9, NRDC 464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(No. 04-1438) [hereinafter NRDC Petition]; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 704; Sturlie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
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from the exemption will occur during the lifetimes of persons, including its
members, alive at the time of the suit and therefore the court should have
based its calculations on lifetime risk rather than annual risks.? NRDC
argued that the court's one in 4.2 billion risk estimate grossly
underestimated the risk to its members and that the actual risk of death or
serious illness was about one in 100,000, or approximately five of its 490,000
members.m' NRDC argued that the risk of death or serious illness for five of
its members was sufficient for standing.2 In opposing NRDC's petition for
rehearing, EPA conceded that the court should not have divided the risk by
145 and should have used lifetime risk instead, but the agency also asserted
that the risk was not "almost 40,000" times higher as NRDC claimed. The
NRDC H court granted the petition for rehearing and withdrew its previous
opinion because "[i]n their respective petition for and opposition to
rehearing, NRDC and EPA offered new information that has led us to change
our view of the standing issue."'
In NRDC I, the court was more willing to consider the plaintiffs
probabilistic standing argument, stating:
Although this claim does not fit comfortably within the Supreme Court's
description of what constitutes an "injury in fact" sufficient to confer
standing-such injuries must be "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical,'". . . we have recognized that increases in risk can at times be
"injuries in fact" sufficient to confer standing.28
The court, however, warned that "this category of injury may be too
expansive. "a Recognizing that the courts of appeals had disagreed about
when an increased risk of harm is enough to justify standing, and whether
the plaintiff must quantify that risk, the court determined that it did not have
to "answer" that difficult question in this case. 7 Cassandra Sturkie and
Nathan Seltzer, who are practicing attorneys, contend that the court
probably did not alter its generally critical approach to probabilistic standing
280 NRDC Petition, supra note 279, at 9; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 704-05; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
281 NRDC Petition, supra note 279, at 9-10; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 705; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
282 NRDC Petition, supra note 279, at 10-11; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons,
supra note 35, at 705; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,293.
283 Respondent EPA's Opposition to NRDC's Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc
at 6, NRDCIH 464 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2006) (No. 04-1438) [hereinafter EPA Opposition]; see also
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 705; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264,
at 10,293-94. ,
284 NRDC , 464 F.3d at 3; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 705; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,294.
285 NRDC H, 464 F.3d at 6; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 705; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,294.
286 NRDC 1, 464 F.3d at 6; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 706; Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,294.
287 NRDCJ 464 F.3d at 6-7; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 706; Craig, supra note 79, at 201.
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claims expressed in its initial opinion. Sturkie and Seltzer suggest that the
court may have become more sympathetic to the plaintiffs standing
arguments when presented with evidence that its erroneous mathematical
calculations in the first opinion significantly underestimated the risk of harm
to the plaintiffs.28 Despite the NRDC H decision, Sturkie and Seltzer
predicted that the D.C. Circuit will reject most probabilistic standing claims;29
after the Summers decision, their prediction is almost certainly correct.20
The NRDC H court held that NRDC had standing because the methyl
bromide exemptions would significantly increase its members' lifetime risk
of skin cancer.nl The court agreed with evidence presented by an EPA
expert that the best measure of risk from ozone depletion is lifetime risk and
not the annualized risk methodology used in NRDC L2 The NRDC Hf
decision concluded that the lifetime risk that an individual will develop
nonfatal skin cancer as a result of EPA's rule is either about one in 200,000,
according to the intervenor's expert, or one in 129,000 by EPA's analysis."3
The court determined that this evidence demonstrated that two to four
members of NRDC's approximately half-million members would develop
skin cancer during their lifetimes as a result of EPA's rule and that two to
four lifetime cases of skin cancer among NRDC's members was a sufficient
injury for NRDC to have standing.294 The NRDC H decision is the strongest
example of probabilistic standing because of the undisputed statistical
evidence that two to four members of the plaintiff organization would likely
develop skin cancer during their lifetimes.m
B. Covington v. Jefferson County
In addition to NRDC, there is one other significant standing decision
involving ozone destroying chemicals (ODCs), Covington v. Jefferson
County.296 As will be discussed below, Covington is a weaker case than
NRDC H because the amount of ODCs released was far less and was
uncertain because of poor record keeping. Nevertheless, Part VI.B.2 will
examine Judge Gould's concurring opinion in Covington because it raised
288 Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,295-96; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 706.
289 Sturlde & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,295-96; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical
Persons, supra note 35, at 706.
290 See supra Part IV.A (explaining Summers rejected organizational standing based on
future probability of injuries to its members).
291 NRDCI 464 F.3d at 5-7; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 201; Mank, Future Generations,
supra note 75, at 47; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 693.
292 NRDCiI 464 F.3d at 7; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 201; Mank, Fture Generations,
supra note 75, at 48; Mank, Standing and Statisdcal Persons, supra note 35, at 693.
293 NRDC iI, 464 F.3d at 7; see also Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35,
at 671-72; Sturkie & Seltzer, supra note 264, at 10,294.
294 NRDC J, 464 F.3d at 7; see also Craig, supra note 79, at 201; Mank, Future Generations,
supra note 75, at 48; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 670.
295 NRDC1 464 F.3d at 7; Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 670.
296 358 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2004).
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some interesting points about standing doctrine in general and the Laidlaw
decision in particular.
1. Mjority Opinion
In Covington, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
the plaintiffs had standing because they were injured by the defendants'
failure to comply with RCRA's safety regulations for a nearby landfill that
increased the risk to the plaintiffs of fires, explosions, groundwater
contamination, scavengers, and disease-carrying vermin27 Despite the Ninth
Circuit's use of the probabilistic term "risk of harm,"8a it is likely that
Covington's standing determination survives Summers because the
Covingtons demonstrated evidence of concrete present harm through a
"factual showing of fires, of excessive animals, insects and other scavengers
attracted to uncovered garbage, and of groundwater contamination."a
Because Summers was a case in which there was no present harm, 00 it is
distinguishable from a case involving any current injury to the plaintiff, such
as Covington. Because the animals, vermin, and groundwater contamination
were located so close to the Covingtons, even courts that construe standing
narrowly would likely be sympathetic to the Covingtons' assertion that they
are suffering present harms from the defendants' failure to comply with
RCRA's safety regulations.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Covington concluded that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated a sufficient injury for standing pursuant to the
CAA by alleging that the defendants had improperly disposed of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in appliances-"white goods"-delivered to the
landfill in violation of the CAA and its reguiations."' The court concluded
that the defendants had injured the plaintiffs by increasing the risk that
CFCs would leak and contaminate the plaintiffs' property.32 The court of
appeals disagreed with the district court's finding that there was no evidence
of leaking or injury because the plaintiffs had stated in their affidavits that
they had observed liquids and gases leaking from the white goodsN' The
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of no standing under the
CAA, stating, "The district court's conclusion on this score cannot stand in
297 358 F.3d at 626, 638-40 (concluding that plaintiffs had standing under RCRA); see also
Mank, Global Wanning, supra note 49, at 40.
298 Covington, 358 F.3d at 638.
299 Id
300 See supra Part IV.A (explaining Summeis rejected organizational standing based on
future probability of injuries to its members).
301 Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41 (discussing the CAA's requirements for disposal of CFCs);
id. at 653 (Gould, J., concurring) (discussing the explicit congressional decision to allow citizen
suits to enforce ozone protection requirements); see Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7671g (2006);
40 C.F.R. §§ 82.154(a), 82.156(f), 82.166(i), (m) (2009) (requiring removal or recapture of CFCs
and other ozone-depleting substances before disposal or recycling); see also Mank, Global
Warming, supra note 49, at 40.
302 Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41 (concluding that plaintiffs had standing under the CAA);
see also Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 40-41.
303 Covington, 358 F.3d at 640 n. 19; see also Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 41.
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this sununary judgment context, where the Coving-tons' evidence, even if
contested, must be credited." m' Additionally, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the defendants had the burden of establishing that CFCs had not leaked
from the appliances because they had failed to keep proper records.'O
Although it was appropriate for the Ninth Circuit to place the burden of
production on the defendants to demonstrate that the CFCs had not leaked
because of their failure to keep proper records, the poor recordkeepmng in
this case makes it impossible to know the precise amount of CFCs that
leaked and hence how much damage was caused to the ozone layer.306
The Summners majority would likely reject the Ninth Circuit's standing
analysis to the extent that the court of appeals simply relied on an increased
risk of future property contamination." Even if the plaintiffs' assertion of
leaking should be presumed factually correct in light of the defendants'
failure to keep proper records7"" the Sumnmers majority might well demand
evidence that the leaking caused some present harm to the plaintiffs because
the plaintiffs did not allege that the CFCs actually touched or harmed them
directly." Nevertheless, the Summers majority might agree with the district
court and Ninth Circuit that the Covingtons suffered a sufficient injury for
standing because of the fires, animals, vermidn, and groundwater
contamination close to their home.3 0
2. Judge Gould's Concuring Opinion
As in NRDC II, a crucial question in Covington was whether plaintiffs
who may be harmed in the future from skin cancer or cataracts caused by
ODCs can sue today. In his concurring opinion in Covington, Judge Gould
addressed this more difficuit question of whether the plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the future or global impacts of the CFCs released from the
landfill.31' According to Judge Gould, because the Covingtons "suffer no
greater injury than any other person" from the global impacts of the CFCs
30 Coviqgton, 358 F.3d at 640 n.19; see also Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 41.
305 Covington, 358 F.3d at 641 n.19 ("[lIE, as here, a CAA claimant demonstrates a failure on
the part of the dispos~er to compile appropriate paperwork showing that CFCs have been
removed from the white goods, we presume that the white goods leaked CFCs unless and until
the disposer affirmatively demonstrates- otherwise."); see also Mank, Global WarmLng suPra
note 49, at 41.
306 See Covlngton, 358 F.3d at 640 n. 19; Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 41.
307 See SumrneiS, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009) (rejecting standing based on statistical
probability that some members of plaintiff organization wiil be harmed in the future).
308 Covington, 358 F.3d at 641 n.19 (observing that defendant failed to keep proper records
showing that CFCs have been removed from the whidte goods and therefore court "presume(dI
that the white goods leaked CF~s unless and until the disposer affirmatively demonstrates
otherwise"); Mank, Global Warming, supra note 49, at 41.
309 See generally Summers 129 S. Ct. at 1149, 1152 (observing that standing requires "likely"
injury, and reasoning that the plaintiffs in Summers failed to demonstrate the "likely" irjury
necessary for standing).
310 Covington, 358 F.3d at 638.
311 See id at 650-55 (Gould, J., concuning); see also Mardi, Global Warming supra note 49, at 4 1.
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from the landfill, the question is whether a plaintiff can meet standing
requirements if he suffers a "widely shared irijUryn 3 12
Judge Gould concluded that the plaintiffs had suffered a particularized
injury, stating, "The increased risk of skin cancer, cataracts, and/or a
suppressed immune system affect the Covingtons in a personal and
individual way. Because the asserted injury is so clearly particularized, my
analysis focuses more on whether the injury is sufficiently concrete in light
of the widespread injUry."31 Additionally, Judge Gould concluded
the injury suffered by the Covingtons is concrete rather than 'abstract and
indefinite' [because] .... the scientific evidence shows a marginal increase in
the risk of serious maladies from increased UV-B radiation that results from the
landfill's release of CFCs. ... These are deadly serious maladies, and the risk of
such grave harms minimizes the required probability of their occurrence for
injury in fact purposes.31
Justice Scalia might disagree with Judge Gould's conclusion that the
injuries to the Covingtons from the CFCs were concrete in light of the
absence of any "factual showing of perceptible harm" from the chemidcals or
from increased UV-B radiation.315 Additionally, Justice Scalia would very
probably, based upon his reasoning in Summers reject standing on the
ground that the injury to the Covmngtons was not "likely" to occur." Because
we do not know the amount of CFCs released at the landfill,"'7 it is
impossible to know the risk that the chemicals pose to society in general, let
alone particular individuals such as the Covingtons.
Furthermore, similar to the argument in Justice Breyer's dissenting
opmnion in Summers that Congress has the authority to broaden standing
rights 3 18 Judge Gould's concurring opinion in Covmngton emphasized that
courts should construe standing, liberally because Congress specifically
prohibited the improper disposal of CFCs and granted an explicit citizen suit
provision to enable a citizen to enforce that prohibition.3 9 Additionally,
Judge Gould determined that there is causation in Coington because
312 Covington, 358 F.3d at 650-51 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming,
supra note 49, at 41.
313a Covington, 358 F.3d at 651-52 n.8 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming
supra note 49, at 42.
314 Covington, 358 F.3d at 652 (Gould, J., concurring); Mank, Global Warming, supra
note 49, at 42.
315 See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1152 (2009) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992)).
316 See id. (observing that standing requires "likely" injury).
317 Covington, 358 F.3d at 641 n.19 (observing that defendant failed to keep proper records
showing that CFCs had been removed from the white goods and therefore the court
.presunmeld] that the white goods leaked CFCs unless and until the disposer affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise"); see also Mank, Global Warming supra note 49, at 41.
318 See Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1154-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("To understand the
constitutional issue that the majority decides, it may prove helpful to imagine that Congress
enacted a statutoryv provision that expressly permitted environmental groups like the
respondents here to bring cases just like the present one. .. ."); supra Part IV.B.
319 Covington, 358 F.3d at 653 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming, supra
note 49, at 42-43.
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"[tihere is a scientifically proven link between CFCs and ozone-depletion"
and Congress had recognized the -significance of the risk by enacting
legislation to regulate CFCs.32'
Moreover, Judge Gould argued that the injury in the Covington case
provided a more compelling justification for standing than the facts in
Laidlaw. "If subjective fear of river pollution alone is enough for injury in
fact, then a fortiori objective and certain increased risks of skin cancer,
cataracts, and depressed immune systems may satisfy the injury in fact
standard."32' A weakness with his argument is that, unlike in the subsequent
NRDCfHfdecision, we do not know how many ODCs the landfill released in
Covington and, therefore, do not know the risk that they posed to either the
public or the Covingtons. 2 Judge Gould's argument that Laidlaw involved
weaker evidence of injury is more apt using the facts of NRDCIJ where the
proven risks of physical harm were greater than in LaidaW.2
Finally, Judge Gould concluded that "the injury is imminent and
redressable. "' He reasoned that the injury to the plaintiffs from the release
of CFCs is immidnent because the release of CFCs immediately increases
their risk of intensified exposure to UV-B3 radiation. 325 justice Scalia,
however, would probably argue that no inury occurs until an exposed
person actually develops skin cancer or cataracts or, alternatively, one can
predict that a specific person is likely to suffer an imminent iriury.36
Furthermore, Judge Gould concluded that the injury is redressable under
LaicllaWs deterrent analysis because the civil penalties authorized under the
CAA against those who midshandle CFCs would deter future violations by the
Jefferson County defendants. 3 7 If sults addressing ozone destruction became
too numerous and burdensome on the judiciary, which he believed to be
unlikely, Judge Gould conceded that courts could impose prudential
320 Covingto n, 358 F.3d at 654 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming supra
note 49, at 43.
321 Covington, 358 F.3d at 653-54 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming
supra note 49, at 43.
322 See Covington, 358 F.3d at 641 n.19 (observing that defendant failed to keep proper
records showing that CFCs had been removed from the white goods and therefore the court
.presume[d] that the white goods leaked CFCs unless and until the disposer affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise"); Mank, Global Warming supra note 49, at 41.
323 Compare Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (1999) (allowing standing even though plaintiffs
could not prove mercury releases by defendant would harm human health or the environment),
KIMh NRDC IT, 464 F.3d 1, 5-7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding risk of one in 129,000 or one in 200,000
that individuals living at lime of methyl bromide releases would develop sklin cancer as a result).
324 Covington, 358 F.3d at 654 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming, supra
note 49, at 43.
325 Covinigton, 358 F.3d at 654 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming, supra
note 49, at 43-44.
326 See Summers, 1298S. Ct. 1142, 1152 (2009) (observing that standing requires "likely" injury
or "a factual showing of perceptible harm" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992))).
327 Covlngton, 358 F.3d at 654 (Gould, J., concurring) (citing Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 185-86);
see also Mank, Global Warming supnz note 49, at 44.
20101 131
132 ENVI7RONMENTAL IA W [Vol. 40:89
standing limits to bar such suits even if plaintiffs have suffered some
minimal injuiry in fact.328
C Applying Laidlaw and Summers to NRDC HI
Applying the standing analysis in Laiclaw and Swnmems to the facts of
NRDC 11 demonstrates the weaknesses of both Supreme Court decisions.
Judge Gould in his Covington concurrence made a good argument that the
objective risk of being harmed from skin cancer or cataracts by the release
of ozone destroying chemicals is a far stronger basis for standing than the
subjective fear of pollution in Laidlaw,3n9 although the evidence of harm was
much weaker in Covngon than NRDC H.3m The evidence that pollution
would cause health impacts was far stronger in NRDC H than in Laidlaw
but the Supreme Court would likely deny standing in a case involving facts
similar to NRDCH because there were no allegations of avoided recreational
uses in NRDC 113' If the Supreme Court's current stainding jurisprudence
would find no standing in NRDC H, but standing in the far weaker Laidla w
decision, then there is a problem with the Court's standing jurisprudence.
Following the reasoning in the Swnmeis decision, a court facing the
same facts as in the NRDC II decision should deny standing because it is not
possible to predict the specific members of NRDC who will develop skin
cancer in the future.3" The Sunmm standing framework is flawed because
it fails to consider the severity and irreversibility of the future probabilistic
328 Covington, 358 F.3d at 654-55 (Gould, J., concurring); see also Mank, Global Warming,
supra note 49, at 44-49. In addition to constitutional standing limitations, the courts may impose
prudential standing limitations as a matter of judicial policy. See, e.g, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 162-63 (1997) (explaining the "zone of interests" standing test as a prudential limitation and
not a constitutional requirement); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978) (prohibiting most third party suits under the prudential standing
doctrine); see also Mank, Fbture Generations, supra note 75, at 28 (discussing prudential
standing restrictions). Unlike constitutional limits on standing, however, Congress may
expressly override prudential limitations. Bennet; 520 U.S. at 162-66 (holding that "unlike their
constitutional counterparts, [prudential limits on standing] can be modified or abrogated by
Congress," and concluding that a citizen suit provision abrogated the zone of interest
limitation); Mank, States Standng, supra note 37, at 1712 n. 50.
329 Covington, 358 F.3d at 653-54 (Gould, J., concurring).
330 See Mank, Global Warming supra note 49, at 43. Compare Covington, 358 F.3d at 640-41
& n. 19 (noting that releases of CFCs and other ozone-depleting substances resulted in an
unspecified increased risk of harm to plaintiffs and observing that defendant failed to keep
proper records showing that CFCs had been removed from the white goods, so the court
.presume[d] that the white goods leaked CFCs unless and until the disposer affirmatively
demonstrates otherwise"), uith NRDC H,; 464 F.3 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding risk of one in
129,000 to 200,000 that individuals living at the time of methyl bromide releases would develop
skin cancer as a result).
331 Compare Laidaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85 (allowing standing even though plaintiffs could not
prove mercury releases by defendant would harm human health or the environment), with
NRDCII, 464 F.3d at 7 (finding risk of one to 129,000 or one in 200,000 that individuals living at
the time of methyl bromide releases would develop skin cancer as a result).
332 See Summer-s; 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (rejecting standing based on statistical
probability that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future).
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harm. In Summers the harm was merely aesthetic and recreational.333 In
NRDCIJ the release of methyl bromide would cause irreversible harm to the
ozone layer and result in an increase in dangerous ultraviolet radiation that
would harm the health of many persons.3m Additionally, the Summers
standing analysis does not consider the quality of the statistical evidence.
It is one thing for a court to reject standing if there is only a remote chance
of harm, but Sumnmers's complete rejection of a probabilistic harm would
result in a serious injustice in cases with strong statistical evidence such as
NRDCIIwhere it is undisputed that some people during their lifetimes will
develop skin cancer.33
Together Summers and Laidla w create a bizarre standing test in which
the loss of recreational activities is more important than the probability that
a chemical will cause injury or death. After Sunmers, the only way that
plaintiffs similar to the NRDCllplaintiffs mnight be able to achieve standing
is to allege that their "reasonable fears" of developing skin cancer from the
effect of methyl bromide releases on the ozone layer led them to avoid
recreational activities in the sun. m6 It would be difficult for most people to
make convincing allegations that they avoid all sun exposure, but an affiant
midght allege that she is inconvenienced by the need to apply sunscreen, to
wear a sun hat, and to restrict her recreational activities when UV levels
from the sun are high. It seems incongruous that the NRDCffplaintiffs could
not claim a sufficient injury for standing from a very real risk of developing
skin cancer because they cannot identify the specific individuals that will be
harmed, as required by Summers 337 but the NRDC HI plaintiffs might be
able to prove a sufficient injury if they avoid recreational activities on
sunny days because of a reasonable fear of developing skin cancer, under
Laidlaws standard.338
SIn combination, Summers's rejection of all probabilistic standing,
apparently without regard to how strong the statistical evidence may be,
along with LaidlaWs overly lenient standing exception for any reasonable
fear that discourages recreational activities, borders on a bizarre
contradiction. Summers is too stringent in denying standing in strong
statistical cases such as NRDCIJ and LaidlaWs generous standing exception
encourages frivolous allegations regarding forgone recreational uses that are
333 See id at 1149-50 (discussing affidavits by members of plaintiff organization that assert
recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal forests and parks).
33 NRDG 12, 464 F.3d at 7 (finding risk of one in 129,000 or one in 200,000 that individuals
living at time of methyl bromide releases would develop skin cancer as a result).
33 Id
336 Laid/sw, 528 U.S. at 181-85 (finding defendant's pollution activities sufficiently injured
plaintiffs for standing because their fear of pollution caused plaintiffs to avoid recreational use
of the river).
337 See Summeis, 129 S. Ct. at 1151 (rejecting standing based on statistical probability that
some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future).
33 Laidiaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85 (allowing standing even though plaintiffs could not prove
mercury releases by defendant would harm human health or the environment because plaintiffs'
fear of pollution caused them to avoid recreational use of the river).
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far less substantial than the facts in NRDC 1 1m A reasonable standing test
ought to find standing in the NRDC H case. As is discussed in Part VII,
Justice Breyer's realistic threat test makes more sense when applied to the
facts of NRDCffthan either Summers or Laida w
VII. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD OVERRULE SUMMERSAND ADOPT JUSTICE
BREYER'S REALISTIC THREAT TEST
In Swrnmers, Justice Scalia quoted his Lujan opinion in arguing that
standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate actual harm rather than the
mere possibility that harm might occur: "Standing, we have said, is not
an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable ... [but] reqies ... a
factual showing of perceptible harm." " ' Accordingly, he concluded,
In part because of the difficulty of verifying the facts upon which such
probabilistic standing depends, the Court has required plaintiffs claiming an
organizational standing to identify members who have suffered the requisite
harm-surely not a difficult task here, when so many thousands are alleged to
have been harmed. 341
Although his argument has some plausibility, there are good policy and
logical reasons for rejecting his approach.
Swmnens's strict rejection of probabilistic standing is implicitly at odds
with LaidlaWs underlying reasoning. The reaisonable concerns test in
Laidlaw implicitly assesses the probability that harm will occur.Y2 A concern
is not reasonable if it is highly unlikely and, therefore, Laidlaw leads courts
to consider the probability of harm. It is true that Laidla w limits the scope of
probabilistic analysis by requiring a plaintiff to allege current avoidance of
recreational activities, but, for plaintiffs alleging the loss of recreational
activities, a court must ultimately evaluate the reasonableness or probability
of harm.13 Any plaintiff that can plausibly allege the loss of recreational
activities can use LaidlaWs reasonable concerns test as an exception to
Summers's strict standing framework.'" As is discussed in Part VI.C, a court
following Summers would find no standing in a new case with facts similar
to NRDC ff because the plaintiff organization cannot demonstrate which of
its members will contract skin cancer in the future, but a court might find
standing if an afflant alleged good faith avoidance of recreational activities
33 Compare Surnmeis, 129 S. Ct. at 1151 (rejecting standing based on statistical probability
that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future), with Laidlaw,
528 U.S. at 181-85 (allowing standing even though plaintiffs could not prove mercury releases
by defendant would harm human health or the environment because plaintiffs' fear of pollution
caused them to avoid recreational use of the river).
340 Suntmei, 129 U.S. at 1152 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992)).
341 rd
342 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85; see supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
344 Laidiaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85.
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in the sun because of reasonable fears of contracting skin cancer."
Logically, the Laidlaw and Summers decisions are philosophically at odds
and one of them should be overruled.3 As Part V explained, however, the
Court likely focused on the superficial factual differences between the
Laidlaw and Summers decisions to avoid the underlying philosophical
contradictions between them!"'
Based on his dissenting opinion in Laidlaw, Justice Scalia might argue
that Laidlaw is an outlier decision that the Court should overrule and the
Court should continue to follow the Ltuan and Summers decisions'
relatively narrow approach to standing48 Yet it seems unlikely that the
Court will overrule Laidlaw, which commanded seven votes.3 The Court
needs a new standing framework that addresses recreational and aesthetic
injuries without making them paramount over more objective health and
physical injuries.
There are good policy reasons for overruling the Summers requirement
that a plaintiff organization identify which members will be harmed in the
future, and instead using a probabilistic approach similar to the NRDC 1H
decision.ni Before Summers was decided, Professor Hsu had argued that
Lujan's requirement of concrete and imminent injuries implicitly required
plaintiffs to identify which individuals will be harmed by a defendant's
challenged action and, therefore, prevented plaintiffs from challenging
diffuse environmental problems that will harm unidentifiable persons in the
future.35' The Summers decision reinforces Lujan's requirement of identifying
specific individuals who will be harmed in the future.& Because
environmental toxins often cause harm only years after exposure,3m the goal
of protecting the public health and the environment would be advanced by
eliminating Lyjan's and Summers's requirement that plaintiffs identify which
individuals will be harmed in the future.M Instead courts should recognize
3s See supra Part VI.C.
346 See supra Part VI.C.
7 See supra Part V.
348 See supra Part I. B.
349 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 171.
350 Mank, Standing andStatisticalPersons, supra note 35, at 724, 728, 732-33.
351 Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FIA. ST. U. L. REV. 433,
436, 440-51, 466-69, 473 (2008) (arguing that Luads requirement of concrete and imminent
injuries for standing implicitly requires plaintiffs to identify the individuals who will be injured
by defendant's actions and thereby prevents suits where injury will occur to unknown persons
in the future); see Summels, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009) (rejecting standing based on
statistical probability that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future);
Lulan, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring concrete and immediate injury); see also Mank,
Future Generations, supra note 75, at 27 (discussing Hsu's argument that standing doctrine has
identifiability bias); Mank, StandingandStatisticalPeisons, supra note 35, at 728-30.
352 See Summeis, 129 S. Ct. at 1151-53 (rejecting standing based on statistical probability
that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future).
353 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 689.
35 See Hsu, supra note 351, at 466-69, 473 (arguing that courts, agencies, and legislatures
should recognize standing and legal liability for probabilistic harms even if the future victims
cannot yet be identified); Mank, Future Generations, supra note 75, at 27 (discussing Hsu's
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standing if there is a realistic probability that an environmental pollutant will
harm at least one member of a plaintiff organization. 355
Justice Breyer's realistic threat test in his Summers dissent is a more
reasonable methodology for determining if an injury has occurred for
standing purposes than Justice Scalia's traditional test in his Summers
majority opinion of requiring proof of an actual or imminent harm .5 ' A
realistic threat of harm should be enough for standing. Modem science
understands that many environmental and health threats are probabilistic in
nature because only a certain percentage of the population exposed to a
toxic chemical is likely to be harmed . 5 ' The NRDC II decision is a
compelling example for applying the realistic threat approach to standing."n
Under Summers, a court should deny standing in NRDC H because it is
impossible to predict which members of NRDC will contract skin cancer.'
Summers leads to an unfortunate policy result in NRDC H because no one
would have standing to challenge a government action that will subject one
in 129,000 or one in 200,000 people to the horrors of skin cancer .3' Even
someone who develops skin cancer in the future probably cannot sue
because that person could not prove that the methyl brom ide exemptions at
issue in NRDC HI caused the particular case of skin cancer because
probability theory can never predict with certainty which individual or
individuals will actually suffer harm, and there are usually other possible
sources of harm.31 By contrast, Justice Breyer's realistic threat test for
standing would very likely allow a court to conclude that NRDC had
established standing to sue in light of their strong statistical evidence of
harm.3 65 The realistic threat test produces a better policy outcome in both
NRDC HI and Summers by enabling plaintiffs to prevent serious
predictable ha
In addition, Justice Breyer's realistic threat test might clarify the
reasonable concerns test in Laidlaw The Laidlaw decision did not provide
argument that courts should recognize standing for probabilistic injuries); Mank, Standing and
Statisti cal Persons, supra note 3 5, at 728.
355 Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 739 (arguing courts should
recognize standing if plaintiff has at least a one in one million probability of suffering serious
injury from the defendant's alleged actions).
356 Compare supra Part MVA (discussing Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Summvers), with
supra Part IV.C (discussing Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Summers).
357 See Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons, supra note 35, at 735, 739.
35 See supra Parts VI.A,.C.
35 See SummerS; 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151-53 (2009) (rejecting standing based on statistical
probability that some members of plaintiff organization will be harmed in the future); supra
Part VI..
360 See supra Parts VIA, .C.
36 Elliott, supra note 35, at 504-05. "An individual risk of death of one in 200,000 does not
actually translate into certainty that one person in a particular group of 200,000 people Will die;
the larger the group gets, the more likely that it contains someone who will eventually suffer the
event subject to the risk analysis, but the qjuestion is always one of probabiit not one of
certainty." Id. at n.221.
362 See supra Part VI.A.
36 See supra Part VI. C.
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any real guidance on what constitutes a reasonable concern.as Based on the
science at that time, the Laidla w plaintiffs could not prove that any of them
were at risk of physical harm, yet the Court found standing.35 By contrast,
Justice Breyer's realistic threat test suggests that a plaintiff organization
midght need to show that at least one of its members will actually suffer harm
in the future."6 The realistic threat test is not perfectly clear, but it appears
to be more transparent than the reasonable concerns test in Laidlaw.
Accordingly, courts could use the realistic threat test to supplement or
supplant the wobbly reasonable concerns test in Laidlaw
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Summers decision purported to prohibit organizational standing
based upon the statistical probability that some of an organization's
members will likely be harmed in the near future by the defendant's
allegedly illegal actions. Justice Scalia's majority opinion condemned Justice
Breyer's dissenting opinion's proposed realistic threat test as wholly
inconsistent with the Court's standing jurisprudence. Yet implicitly the Court
recognized some form of probabilistic standing in Laidlaw, which found
standing where plaintiffs avoided recreational activities because of
reasonable concerns about future health injuries from pollution.167
There is an inherent tension between the Summers decision's rejection
of any consideration of probabilistic future injuries and the Laidlaw
decision's probabilistic assessment of what are. reasonable concerns." The
Court has fudged this tension by limiting Laidlaw to cases in which a
plaintiff alleges avoidance of recreational activities because of a fear of
pollution .31, It is likely that courts will ignore the tension by limiting the
application of the Summers and the Laidlaw decisions to cases that are
factually similar .3 '0 Nevertheless, future plaintiffs may seek to avoid
Summers and embrace Laidlaw by manipulating the facts of a case to
include claims of lost recreational activities. 7
This Article applies the Summers and Laidla w frameworks to the facts
in NRDC jf372 Both Summers and Laidlawproduce questionable results when
36 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181-85 (2000); supra Part VI.C.
365 Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181-85.
366 See Elliott, supra note 35, at 504-05 & n.222 (arguing the NRDCildecision requires that
at least one member of an organization has suffered harm); see also Sumnmem, 129 S. Ct. 1142,
1155-58 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that plaintiff organizations have standing
because there is a realistic threat that at least one of their members is likely to be injured in
the future).
367 LaidlaW, 528 U.S. at 181-83 (adopting the "reasonable concerns" test for whether
plaintiff s avoidance of recreational activities is sufficient for standing).
368 See supra Part V.C.
369 See SUpra part V.C.
370 See supra Part V.
371 See supra Part V.C.
372 See supra Part VI.C.
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applied to NRDG iLrs facts.373 Sumnmers's rejection of all probabilistic
standing is difficult to justify in the face of the government's admission in
NRDC H that its exemption of certain uses of methyl bromidde would cause
some members of NRDC to develop skin cancer. 374 In Summers, the
government did not admit that its policies would cause harm, and any
possible harm was purely aesthetic and recreational 'and thus less serious
than in NRDG IL. Swnmers's requirement that a plaintiff organization must
identify which of its members will be harmed in the future is more difficult
to justify when the government authorizes the release of harmful toxic
chemicals that it concedes will harm some people in the future. 7
Likewise, the Laidlaw decision produces questionable results when it is
applied to the facts of NRDC H37 Laidlawallowed standing where there was
no proof of actual harm to the environment or the plaintiffs because their
reasonable concerns about mercury pollution led the plaintiffs to avoid
recreational activities in a river. 7 Judge Gould in his concurring opinion in
Covington correctly reasoned that the injury caused by ODCs was far greater
than the aesthetic and recreational harm in Laidlaw, although the facts of
NRDCfHpresent a stronger case than those in Covington. 7 1 It is incongruous
to recognize standing in Laidlaw, but deny it in NRDCffbecause we cannot
predict which particular members of NRDC wil develop skin cancer.no0 The
only way plaintiffs similar to the NRDC H plaintiffs can achieve standing is
to allege that they have curtailed recreational activities, but the injury
caused by avoiding sunbathing is far less serious than the probabilistic risk
of developing skin cancer, which is probably not a grounds for standing
under current law."" The combination of Sumnmers's strictness and LaidlaW's
leniency will encourage plaintiffs to manipulate the facts of a case to allege
that members have, for instance, avoided sunbathing activities because of
their reasonable concerns about getting skin cancer.~3 A better approach to
standing is needed.
Because of the tensions and inconsistencies revealed when Sumnmers
and Laidlaw are applied to the facts of the NRDC H decision, the Court
should abandon both Sumnmers and Laidlaw approaches to standing and
instead adopt Justice Breyer's proposed realistic threat test to achieve more
equitable and uniform standing determidnations.33 Justice Breyer's test is
more sensible about the nature of injuries than Sumnmers. 38 His approach is
consistent with citizen suit statutes in which Congress has provided that
373 See supra Part VI.C.
37 See supra Part vI.
375 Compare supra Part MVA (Summeia), with supra1 Part VIAlI (NRDCOI).
376 See supra Part VI.C.
377 See supra Part VI.C.
378 Laidaw, 528 U.S. 167, 181-83 (2000).
379 Covington, 358 F.3d 626, 653-54 (9th Cir. 2004) (Gould, J., concurring).
30See supra Part VI.C.
381 See supra Part V.C.
382 See supra Part VI.C.
38 See supra Parts VIC, VII.
384 See supra Part VII.
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"any person"~ may bring suit&35 Surely, it is realistic to assume that at least
one of the Sierra Club's 700,000 members will be harned by the Service's
timber salvage sales and would have commented if the Service had followed
its public notice and comment procedures; even Justice Scalia
acknowledged that it was "certainly possible-perhaps even likely-that one
individual will meet all of these criteria."m The weakness and lack of realism
of Justice Scalia's approach is even more obvious and harmful when applied
to the threat of environmental harms that are more serious and inherently
probabilistic harms such as developing skin cancer as a result of the action
of ODCs.8' Additionally, the realistic threat test provides more clarity than
the reasonable concerns test in Laidlaw.3m The realistic threat test could
produce more uniform results because it could be applied to both
nonrecreational and recreational cases and thus could supplant the
inconsistent Sumnmers and Laidlaw framneworks.3m As Justice Breyer
suggested in. his dissent, a future court might use a broad reading of either
Lyons or Massachusetts v. EPA to argue that the Court has already endorsed
probabilistic standing, at least where there is a realistic threat of harm. m
If the Court does not overrule Summuers Congress could adopt Justice
Breyer's advice and test the Court's standing doctrine by adopting a statute
that explicitly confers standing rights on plaintiffs challenging future timber
salvage sales.a1 It would be interesting to see how Justice Kennedy would
decide a case where Congress has explicitly conferred standing rights on
behalf of an organization whose members are likely to be harmed in the
future by the Executive Branch's alleged failure to enforce the law."' 2
Only through probabilistic standing can citizens truly enforce the numerous
citizen suit statutes that Congress has enacted to allow citizens to sue as
private attorneys general to force the Executive Branch to comply with
specific congressional directives in those statutes.9
385 See supra Parts I, IV.B.
386 Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1152 (2009); see also id at 1156, 1158 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that it is likely that members of the plaintiff organizations will be harmed by the
government's sale of fire-damaged timber without required public notice and comment);
supra Part IV C.
38 See Supra partsV.C, VII[.
38 See supra Part MII
389 See supra Parts VI. C, VII.
390 See supra Part WYC.
391 See supra Partl WB.
392 See supra Part J B.
393 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing citizen suits and "public law" statutes).
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